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                                                         ABSTRACT 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Black Sea and Eastern 
Mediterranean Studies at the International Hellenic University. Aim of this work is to 
demonstrate that the Greeks of Pontus have been an organic part of Hellenism by 
examining Greek nation and identity and at the same time highlighting the 
“Greekness” of the Southern Black Sea Hellenic population (Πόντιοι, Greeks of 
Pontus). 
The period examined ends with the Exodus of Asia Minor Greek population. 
Before the tragic events in the early 1920s, there were attempts for the end of 
Ottoman rule in the region of Pontus.  These attempts range from autonomy and 
Ponto-Armenian Federation to independence and inclusion to the Greek state. The 
Ottoman empire “theater” had many “actors” whose motives and actions shaped 
history. The chaotic post World War I world and the conflicting interests played its 
own important role in the outcome of events. 
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                                         Introduction 
Abdülhamid II’s rise to power signifies the end of the Tanzimât period in the 
Ottoman empire. The age of reforms gives its place to an era in which Turkish 
nationalism gains its characteristic elements and the multinational Ottoman empire is 
transformed into the modern Turkish state out of the ashes of war.  
In an era when nationalism  is the dominant policy all around the world, 
national homogeneity is everything. The peoples of the Ottoman empire learned this 
in the most brutal and harsh way. In 1895/6 there are massacres of Armenians in the 
Eastern provinces of the empire. It is a prelude of what would follow. 
The Young Turks movement signifies the beginning of the end. From 1908 
onwards the conditions for the Christian populations become harder and harder. In 
1911 the nationalist fraction become the driving force inside the movement, in a 
desperate effort to save the empire. The Balkan wars and World War I speed up its 
dissolution. Christians attempt to make their own fate and at the same time they are 
demonized in the eyes of the Turks, as responsible for what is going on. It was clear 
that Christians and Muslims could no longer co-exist. Turkey had to be Turkified. The 
Armenian and Pontic Greek genocides aimed to this direction. Asia Minor Catastrophe 
in 1922 is a new start for both Greece and Turkey. 
This work attempts to highlight Pontic Greeks and their movements in what 
was going to be the last years in their homelands. With the rise of nationalism and the 
progressive maturing of national identities, Pontic Greeks managed to preserve their 
Greek identity and fought to free themselves from the Ottoman yoke. It is of course 
essential to showcase the Greek identity of the Hellenic Southern Black Sea 
populations, which we Greeks call Πόντιοι (Greeks of Pontus, Pontic Greeks). 
Equally important though is to define Greek identity in order to engulf the 
Greeks of Pontus into it. The elements that constitute Greek identity and afterwards 
the elements the Greeks of Pontus share with the rest of the Greeks. Since national 
identity is never without a national state, the key elements of the modern Greek 
nation will also be presented. 
The events of roughly the first quarter of the 20th century cannot be 
understood without nationalism and pan-movements. An analysis of the phenomenon 
of nationalism and the most important maximalist movements that were products of 
it will be examined. In this framework, the Greek counterpart, “Megali Idea” will also 
be examined, so as to elaborate how Greece claimed its national completeness 
through a quarter of a century of constant warfare and where the Greeks of Asia Minor 
stood in that time. 
After the end of World War I there is the almost immediate break out of the 
Greco-Turkish war. In a chaotic post-world war, the Greeks of Pontus tried to create 
their own future. Under adverse conditions they pursued the dream of ending the 
Ottoman yoke. Their pursuits and actions are a matter of analysis in the present work 
alongside the Greek handling of the Asia Minor campaign. In this effort to bring all 
these elements together under a single work, a general presentation of Pontus in 
terms of morphology and population was rendered as necessary.  It goes without 
saying that the international factor and interests of the Great powers, but also the 
Turkish side, are debated as well. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      1.   Pontus: Geography and Population  
                    1a. Pontus: Geography and morphology of the region 
The core of the ancient and medieval Pontus was the naturally enclosed area 
between the river Akampsis (Çoruh) in the east and the river Alis (Kızıl Irmak) in the 
west1.  It is an area where water is abundant, and its rivers, navigable in their majority, 
are large2. The northern border of Pontus is the Black Sea while in the south two 
mountain ranges mark its borders3. The first one is the Pontic Alps, a single orographic 
scheme which extends in a scythe shape from the river Çoruh to the river Iris (Yeşil 
Irmak)4. Outside these borders, in Kolchis, modern day Georgia, the river Rioni (Fasis), 
marked the border between Europe and Asia according to Aeschylus, in Prometheus 
in chains5.   
Three summit lines of the Pontic mountains, that of Lazistan (Pariadros), 
Zigana and Canık, as well as the middle part of the rivers Çoruh and Kelkit (Lykos), are 
the first southern natural border of Pontus6. Alongside it, defense could be easily 
organized7. Parallel to this range further in the south, crossing the upstream of 
Euphrates there was another range and if the circumstances allowed it the Pontic 
borders could extent to that point8. The most striking feature of Pontus was the 
horizontal bisection of the region, into a coastal zone and a mountainous hinterland. 
The valleys were in constant contact with the coast thanks to the vertical route of the 
rivers9.  
The mountains in this area are really high especially in the east where they 
reach a height just over 3.000 meters, while in the west they reach 2.000-2.500 
 
1 Καρπόβ, Σεργκέι Π., Ιστορία της αυτοκρατορίας της Τραπεζούντας, 40. 
2 Ξανθοπούλου-Κυριακού, Άρτεμις, Γεωργανόπουλος, Ευριπίδης Π., Χατζηκυριακίδης, Κυριάκος, Οι 
Έλληνες του Πόντου και η Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία (1461-1923), 23. 
3 Καρπόβ, Σεργκέι Π., Ιστορία της αυτοκρατορίας της Τραπεζούντας, 40. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ξανθοπούλου-Κυριακού, Άρτεμις, Γεωργανόπουλος, Ευριπίδης Π., Χατζηκυριακίδης, Κυριάκος, Οι 
Έλληνες του Πόντου και η Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία (1461-1923), 23. 
6 Καρπόβ, Σεργκέι Π., Ιστορία της αυτοκρατορίας της Τραπεζούντας, 40. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ξανθοπούλου-Κυριακού, Άρτεμις, Γεωργανόπουλος, Ευριπίδης Π., Χατζηκυριακίδης, Κυριάκος, Οι 
Έλληνες του Πόντου και η Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία (1461-1923), 23. 
meters10. If one wanted to cross them, he would have to go through some dangerous 
cols which were well guarded in case of a land invasion11. The whole area of Pontus is 
mountainous, with the mountains often reaching the sea. The only important valleys 
were created by the depositions of the rivers in the west, Kızıl and Yeşil Irmak12. On an 
axis from west to the east, as the mountains rise up and get closer to the sea, the only 
way to cross them is through the rivers forming valleys, where even today it is easier 
to gain access from the shores, rather than through the mountain cols.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
 
10 Καρπόβ, Σεργκέι Π., Ιστορία Της Αυτοκρατορίας Της Τραπεζούντας, 40. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 41. 
                                           1b. Pontus: Population 
The question of the population in Pontus and its ethnological composition is 
particularly complex even before the end of the empire of Trebizond. One must be 
attentive when dealing with this matter especially when the period he occupies 
himself with is the late 19th and early 20th century, when people and numbers obtain 
a national coloring. 
The multinational character of the Ottoman Pontus was also a reality during 
the Byzantine era. During the 13th and 14th century, the main ethnic body of the area 
were the Greeks and the local Hellenized ethnicities, following the Byzantine era 
situation14. The Greek nation was the driving force of every aspect of life. These Greeks 
were Pontic Greeks, a particular sub-nation which had a distinct ancient dialect15. 
Alongside them one could find Greeks from every corner of the Greek world16. 
From the local ethnicities, the Laz were perhaps the second largest element in 
Pontus, concentrated in the Southeast (Surmene, Rize, Lazica, Heriana)17. The 
Armenians were also a powerful element in the southern provinces from Ispir to 
Baıpurt to Şebın Karahısar and Niksar (Neokaisareia) to the Northwest and West18. 
There were also the Chaldi, a Hellenized population in the southern edge of 
the once Byzantine thema of Chaldia19. The Georgians of the empire resided both in 
the borders of Pontus and in the cities20.  
As far as the Turkic tribes is concerned, after their settlement in the periphery 
and in the empire itself, Oğuz, Kumans, Arabs, Kurds, Persians and Mongols were 
assimilated with the Greeks of Trebizond, as well as the Turks21. 
 
14 Ibid., 134. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 135. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 134. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 136. 
In the empire one could also encounter Venetians, Genoese22, Russians and 
other Slavs23. Pontus was one of the most densely populated areas of Byzantium24 and 
according to Anthony Bryer, the empire of Trebizond was the most important in terms 
of Greek element, Greek state in the 15th century.25 By the time of the conquest of 
Trebizond, Bryer estimate the city’s population between 4.000-5.000 citizens26, based 
on the Ottoman Tahrirs and the Greek chronographers, despite the ambiguity that 
emits from them. For roughly the same period Sergei Karpov gives a slightly higher 
estimation of 6.000-6.500 people27. 
The situation in the first centuries of Ottoman occupation until the 19th century 
is really obscure because of the lack of sources and the unreliability of the existing 
ones. Heath Lowry28 provides an interesting study of the population of the city of 
Trebizond in the 16th century. By 1583, out of a total 10.575 residents, 5.670 were 
Muslims, 4.055 Greek Orthodox, 615 Armenians and 215 Roman Catholics29. 
Until the 19th century the population in Pontus was always under threat by 
epidemics, which were a constant phenomenon. Reduction of population was 
therefore a common thing, as was the case in the 18th century30. After 1840s though, 
there is an increase in population despite the epidemics and the continuous migration, 
which resulted in the resettlement of areas that had been de-Hellenized long ago and 
ended up being the most densely populated areas in Asia Minor31.  
Data increases from the second half of the 19th century onwards, but so do the 
problems and the ambiguities. In this period, national aspirations and state 
expediencies led states on an attempt to capitalize on numbers and people. When 
dealing with the population of Pontus in this era, the parameters needed to be taken 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 137. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Bryer, A. and Lowry, H. W., Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society, 58. 
26 Ibid., 121. 
27 Καρπόβ, Σεργκέι Π., Ιστορία Της Αυτοκρατορίας Της Τραπεζούντας, 138. 
28 Lowry, Heath W., The Islamization & Turkification of the City of Trabzon (Trebizond), 1461-1583. 
29 Ibid., 146. 
30 Ξανθοπούλου-Κυριακού, Άρτεμις, Γεωργανόπουλος, Ευριπίδης Π., Χατζηκυριακίδης, Κυριάκος, Οι 
Έλληνες του Πόντου και η Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία (1461-1923), 114. 
31 Ibid. 
into account are more than a few. First of all, the lack of the way the Ottoman censi 
were conducted and the state purposes compromise their trustworthiness32. If one 
adds the fact that Muslims were pressured to be written down more than once, and 
that Christians tried to avoid it33, then matters get even more complexed. The censi of 
the Patriarchate or the consulates are at times more detailed, but they do not avoid 
their own issues34. Further limitations stem from the unclear geographical borders of 
Pontus and the peculiarities of the Greek- Christian population in the area35. When it 
comes to the latter, one must define Greek in the region. When we say Greek, we 
mean Rum (Ρωμιός), the Orthodox Christian Greek36. However, in the body of the 
“Greek” element, one could include the Greek Catholics and Protestants, who were 
not part of a distinct ethno-religious community and had Greek consciousness37. 
There are also the populations of Islamized Greeks who could be separated in 
different categories38. Those who alongside their religion had also lost their language, 
had in general terms been assimilated by the Muslim population which had an 
Ottoman-Turkish conscious substrate39.  
Those who had kept their language pose an even greater challenge. They are 
separated in two categories as well. The cryptochristians and those who do not seem 
to have been such, but also entirely Turkish speaking cryptochristians were to be 
found40. A special allusion needs to be done about the cryptochristian issue. The 
phenomenon of cryptochristianism appeared more or less in the same way in every 
region. Shortly after the conquest of a certain area the process of islamization began. 
Part of the population accepted the new faith and was thus eventually assimilated, 
 
32 Γεωργανόπουλος, Ευρυπίδης Π., “Τα Πληθυσμιακά Στοιχεία Για Τον Πόντο (1870-1912): Κριτική 
Προσέγγιση Και Συγκριτική Παρουσίασή Τους,” 200. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 203. 
35 Ibid., 201. 
36 Ibid., 202. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 203. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
another part retained its faith and a final third one accepted Islam superficially, 
keeping its connection to Christianity41. 
In Pontus the islamization began in 1461. The pressures imposed though by 
the Ottoman regime during the first islamization period until the mid17th century     
were light, when compared to other regions42. Ottoman leaders starting from Mehmet 
II (1451-1481) until the Köprülü dynasty of the Great Vezyrs and Sultan Mehmet IV 
(1648-1687) were oriented towards the west, not imposing thus in Pontus, the laws 
that were a reality for most of the occupied Christian territories43. The situation 
changed dramatically however, from the mid17th century onwards. The increase in 
power of the Derebeys signaled the end of the up to a certain point mediocre Ottoman 
administration in the area44.  Hattı Humajun in 1856 was the start of a period of 
general improvement for the cryptochristians that lasted until 191145. Despite the 
limitations of the Ottoman administration, thousands of people declared their 
Christian faith46. For example, in 1857 a Great Powers committee presented the 
following data for the Korum (Κρώμνη) region: in 55 villages of the region including 
Gümüşhane (Αργυρούπολη), Dumanlı (Σάντα), Uğurtaşı (Σταυρί) and Olucak köyü 
(Ίμερα), resided 9.535 Muslims, 17.260 cryptochristians and 28.960 Christian 
Greeks47. 
After 1911 though, things started to get worse not only for Christians but 
cryptochristians as well48.The end of World War I was followed by the Greco-Turkish 
war of 1919-1922 and the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. The exchange of populations was 
a kind of solution, that exclusively took into account the religious factor. After all, the 
notion of nation in the Ottoman empire was religious rather than cultural. During the 
empire’s lifetime there was a gradual bond developed between “Turkness” and 
 
41 Φωτιάδης, Κωνσταντίνος Ε., Οι Εξισλαμισμοί Της Μικράς Ασίας Και Οι Κρυπτοχριστιανοί Του 
Πόντου, 195. 
42 Ibid., 214. 
43 Ibid., 215. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 227. 
46 Ibid., 229. 
47 Balance, S., Bryer, A., and Winfield, D., Nineteenth-Century Monuments in the City and Vilayet of 
Trebizond, 272. 
48 Φωτιάδης, Κωνσταντίνος Ε., Οι Εξισλαμισμοί Της Μικράς Ασίας Και Οι Κρυπτοχριστιανοί Του 
Πόντου, 238. 
Islam49.  In any case, only the cryptochristians that had formally declared their faith 
were transferred to Greece50.  One should bear in mind there were programs of 
Turkification before and during the Turkish Republic, that had a Sunni- Turkish 
background. Despite the absence of systematic measures taken towards Turkification 
and Islamization after 1919, the Greeks that did not “become Turks/Muslims” and 
cannot migrate to Greece though they are forced to for a number of reasons, changed 
their names51. During the period 1919-1925 these Greeks and particularly women and 
children, started living with Sunni/Turkish families, thus initiating the assimilation 
progress52.  With this Sunni/Turkish nationalization plan that goes on until today, non-
Muslims were oppressed and forced to create new lives53. Despite these facts, it is 
possible that cryptochristians remained in Pontus even after 1923.      
Not everyone in Turkey agrees of course. Some deny the existence of forced 
islamizations and claim that even if they did happen, they were voluntary and very 
few to be seriously taken into account54. Thus, they also deny the existence of 
cryptochristians. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 Kaya, Mert, “1919-1925 Yılları Arasında Anadolu Rumlarının Müslümanlaştırılması Üzerine Bir Bellek 
Çalışması,” 48. 
50 Φωτιάδης, Κωνσταντίνος Ε., Οι Εξισλαμισμοί Της Μικράς Ασίας Και Οι Κρυπτοχριστιανοί Του 
Πόντου, 240. 
51 Kaya, Mert, “1919-1925 Yılları Arasında Anadolu Rumlarının Müslümanlaştırılması Üzerine Bir Bellek 
Çalışması,” 48–49. 
52 Ibid., 57. 
53 Ibid., 51. 
54 Tellıoğlu, İbrahim, “Pontus Meselesini Çözümsüzlüğe Iten Iddia ve Talepler,” 533. 
2. Theory on nationalism, Pan-Movements, the modern Greek nation-
state and the Pontic Greeks 
                       2a. Theory on nationalism 
Much of the present work has to do with nations, nation-states and national 
identities. But it is not just that. The writer deals with them in a period which is 
arguably the height of nationalism. Therefore, since terms like “nation”, “national 
identity” and “state” are to be found regularly on the “body” of this analysis, it was 
understood as necessary to explain and interpret those terms that everyone uses but 
not everyone knows or understands their meaning in their true basis. There will be an 
attempt to present the dominant theories on nation and national identity, as well as 
those elements that constitute a nation and its identity as such. 
In International relations the exact meaning of the term “nation” is 
undefined55. On the other hand the definition of the term “state” exists in the 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States(1933) Article 1, which reads: 
‘The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 
a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to 
enter into relations with the other states.’56 Nation has to do with something 
subjective, even if it is a collective subjectivity distinct from the objective features of 
state57. 
 According to the constructivist theory, the nation is a construct, built and 
altered by people to define the identity of a political community in shifting 
circumstances. This construct is a mixture of traditional elements and new inventions 
necessary to build a contextual story of “we”58. This approach is well aware of the 
historical components of national identity and the importance of historic and 
legendary myths and heroes serving as a foundation for that identity, without taking 
these historical ingredients as the decisive elements of nationhood. National identity 
 
55 Grotenhuis, René, Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States, 25. 
56 https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20165/v165.pdf. 
57 Grotenhuis, René, Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States, 28. 
58 Ibid., 26. 
is a living dynamic reality59. Anderson’s definition on nation fits well here. “The nation 
is an imagined political community- imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign”60. 
For constructivists the nation is a result of a construction and invention, not 
the result of a process of presenting something from the past into present and future. 
Nation comes to life by people who are seeking to create a nation and are bringing 
together the elements to construct it. During this process it may be important to 
deliberately leave out those elements that do not help the construction of a shared 
national identity61. 
The construction of a national identity is a process of selection. The attempts 
to trace back the nation into history to link the existing nation to its historical roots 
are conscious actions to connect a national identity of an actual living community to 
historical events, persons and narratives62. 
As far as nation-states is concerned, the constructivist theory believes that 
they are a result of war. Charles Tilly has said that war makes states and states make 
war63. “State-making happens as the result of a process of rivaling factions vying for 
power by using violence”64. The making of nation-state was not a tidied-up process of 
design and negotiation but one of different “organized criminal groups” fighting for 
power65. 
The violent origin of the nation-state is a recurrent fact in history66, however a 
nation has no existential legitimacy without the sovereignty of people- the founding 
principle of nation-. No theory of nation-building can develop without placing people 
the center. The principle of peoples’ sovereignty was established thanks to 
Enlightenment. From being the object of governance, people became the subject67. 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, 6. 
61 Grotenhuis, René, Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States, 28. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Tilly, Charles, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 184. 
64 Grotenhuis, René, Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States, 33. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 34. 
67 Ibid., 59. 
One should also bear in mind that nation states emerged as a process of 
homogenization in terms of language and culture. Homogeneity is nothing more than 
the adaptation of a shared mainstream identity, leaving at the same time a particular 
identity behind68. Nation-building therefore is the process by which people are bound 
to a common identity in language, culture, social and political systems, celebrate the 
same heroes, visit the same historic places and exercise publicly a dominant religion  
if it is considered to be an important factor of the nation69. 
Similar views can be traced in Gellner, who believed that “nations are products 
of nationalism and not vice versa”70, and Brubaker, who claims that “nations are by 
no means enduring components of social structure. They are constructed contingent 
and fluctuating. They are illusory or spurious communities and an ideological smoke-
screen”71. 
There is on the other hand a different approach to nation and national identity. 
Anthony D. Smith believes that what we mean by national identity involves some 
sense of political community however tenuous. A political community in its turn must 
at least have some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all 
members. A definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory with 
which the members identify and of which they feel they are part, are also necessary. 
This is a quite Western conception of the nation72. 
Nations must have a measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of 
common understandings, goals and ideas that creates a connection between the 
people and their homeland. The standard components of the Western model of the 
nation are a historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of 
members, a common civic culture and ideology73. 
There is though, another model, a non-Western one, that emphasizes on the 
ethnic conception of the nation. The distinguishing feature is its emphasis on a 
 
68 Ibid., 110. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Walicki, Andrzej, “Ernest Gellner and the ‘Constructivist’ Theory of Nation,” 611. 
71 Brubaker, Rogers, “Rethinking Nationhood,” 19. 
72 Smith, Anthony D., National Identity, 9. 
73 Ibid. 
community of birth and native culture. The ethnic concept does not allow choice of 
nation. A nation is above all a community of common descent74. 
This model presents a number of facets. The stress on descent (or descent 
rather than territory). The nation is a fictive super-family which boasts pedigrees and 
genealogies to back up its claims, especially in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
The nation searches its beginning to an imputed common ancestry. This means its 
members are brothers and sisters or at least cousins differentiated by family ties from 
outsiders75. 
The place of law in the western civic model is taken by vernacular culture, 
usually languages and customs. Another interesting element is the key role of 
lexicographers, philologists and folklorists. Their linguistic and ethnographic research 
into the past and present culture of the “folk” provided the material for a blueprint of 
the nation “under construction” even where specific linguistic revivals failed. By 
spreading the myths, history and linguistic traditions of the community, they 
succeeded in formulating the idea of an ethnic nation in the minds of most members, 
even when ancient languages, like in the case of Norway, declined76. 
Despite the different models of nations, some common assumptions about 
nation and common features of national identity can be extracted: a) historic territory 
or homeland b) common myths and historical memories c) common mass public 
culture d) common legal rights and duties for all members e) common economy with 
territorial mobility for members77.  
A national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional. It can never be reduced 
to a single element even by particular factions of nationalists, nor can it be easily or 
swiftly induced in a population by artificial means78. National identities fulfill intimate 
internal functions for individuals or communities as well. Most obvious is the 
socialization of the members as nationals and citizens. This is achieved through 
 
74 Ibid., 11. 
75 Ibid., 12. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 14. 
78 Ibid. 
mandatory standardized public mass education systems, through which state 
authorities aim to instill national devotion and a distinctive homogenous culture, a 
goal most regimes pursue with considerable energy under the influence of nationalist 
ideals of cultural authenticity and unity79. 
The nation is also called up to provide a social bond between individuals and 
classes by providing repertoires of shared values, symbols and traditions. Using these 
symbols, members are reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship and 
feel proud of their sense of common identity and belonging. The nation becomes a 
“faith achievement group” able to overcome obstacles and hardships80. 
A sense of national identity is a powerful means of defining and locating one’s 
self in the world, through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive 
culture. It is due to a shared unique culture that we are enabled to know “who we are” 
in the contemporary world. By rediscovering that culture, we “find” ourselves, the 
“authentic” self or so it seemed to many disoriented individuals who have had to settle 
with the vast changes and uncertainties of the modern world. This process of self-
definition is in many ways the key element to national identity81.         
Adrian Hastings82 moves a step away from the constructivists and claims that 
“for the development of nationhood from one or more ethnicities by far the most 
important and widely present factor is that of an extensively used vernacular 
literature”83. 
A long struggle against an external enemy may also have a significant effect 
similar to state formation in some cases, though the latter may well have no national 
effect whatever elsewhere. A nation may precede or follow a state of its own, but it is 
certainly assisted by it to greater self-consciousness. Most such developments are 
caused by the perception of a nation-state and of the world as a society of nations, 
originally “imagined” through the mirror of the Bible, Europe’s primary textbook but 
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turned into a formal political philosophy no earlier than the 19th century, and then 
next to be canonized by President Woodrow Wilson and the Versailles Peace 
Settlement in 192084. 
“An Ethnicity -argues Hastings- is a group of people with a shared cultural 
identity and spoken language. It constitutes the major distinguishing element in all 
pre-national societies but may survive as a strong subdivision with a loyalty of its own 
within established nations85”. 
A nation however is a far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity, 
formed from one or more ethnicities and normally identified by a literature of its own, 
it has or demands the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, along with 
the control of specific territory, comparable to that of biblical Israel and of other 
independent entities in a world thought of as one of nation-states86. 
A nation-state is a state which identifies itself in terms of one specific nation 
whose people are not seen simply as “subjects” of the sovereign but as a horizontally 
bonded society to whom the state in a sense belongs. There is thus an identity of 
character between state and people. In some ways the state’s sovereignty is inherent 
within the people, expressive of its historic identity. In it, ideally there is a basic 
equivalence between the borders and character of the political unit upon the one 
hand and a self-conscious cultural community on the other. In most cases this is a 
dream and reality at the same time. Most nation-states in fact include groups of 
people who are not part of its core culture or feel themselves to be part of a nation so 
defined. Nevertheless, almost all modern nation-states act on the bold assumption 
that they are nation-states87. 
As far as nationalism is concerned, it means two things:  theory and practice. 
As a political theory that each nation should have its own state, it derives from the 
19th century. That general theory though, motivates few nationalists. In practice 
nationalism is strong only in particularist terms, coming from the belief that one’s own 
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ethnic or national tradition is extremely important and needs to be defended at 
almost any cost through creation or extension of its own nation-state.  Nationalism 
became theoretically central to Western political thinking in the 19th century, but it 
existed as a powerful reality long before that. As something which can empower large 
numbers of ordinary people, nationalism is a movement which seeks to provide a state 
for a given nation or further to advance the interests of its own nation-state regardless 
of other considerations. It “blossoms” mainly where and when a particular ethnicity 
or nation feels itself threatened in regard to its own proper character, extent or 
importance, either by external attack or by the state system of which it has hitherto 
become part; but nationalism can also be stoked up to fuel the expansionist 
imperialism of a powerful nation-state, though this is even possible to be done under 
the guise of an imagined threat or grievance88. 
Religion is also an integral element of many cultures, most ethnicities and 
some states. The Bible provided, for the Christian world at least, the original model of 
the nation. Without it and its Christian interpretation and implementation, it is 
arguable that nations and nationalism as we know them could ever have existed. 
Moreover, religion has produced the dominant character of some state-shaped 
nations and of some nationalisms. Biblical Christianity both assists the cultural and 
political world out of which the phenomena of nationhood and nationalism as a whole 
developed, and in a number of important cases was the crucial feature for the 
particular history of both nations and nationalism89. 
John Breuilly90 has a rather similar view of the nation-state. He argues “that 
the development of the political concept of nation was related to the ways in which 
the absolutist or would be absolutist state in early modern Europe shaped political 
thought and action”91.  
The modern nation-state is the possessor of sovereignty over a certain 
territory. This idea of state is highlighted by internal tensions between universality and 
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particularity, and between boundlessness and limitation. The state is universal in the 
sense that it envisioned a world made of a number of similar states92. The state is 
boundless in that it asserts ultimate power over the lives of those within it. It is the 
highest form of human existence in the sense that all other forms of existence are 
subordinate to it93.    
A nationalist movement therefore strives to link people with a particular 
territory in an endeavor to gain and use state power. The general context for the 
development of such a movement is supplied by the modern state and the strategic 
relationships to that state of reform, separation and unification94.   
Apparently, there are multiple approaches towards the nation. One such is the 
nationalist approach which deems that nationalism is an expression of nation. The 
“first” level of nationalism takes the form of culture and sentiments. The nation when 
characterized this way desires independence. However, it seems impossible to give an 
independent definition of the nation. The definitions provided by nationalists 
themselves vary enormously and conflict with one another. Another explanation is 
that nationalism is related to some prior development of national identity95. 
One of the most interesting approaches is that of communications. The 
“nation” is a developed system of internal communications which creates a sense of 
common identity. It is arguable that one can only conceive of the different social 
groups inhabiting a certain territory as having something in common that spreads 
their many differences among them (even similarities with groups outside the 
territory) if they do have regular and intensive communication among themselves. 
It is also arguable that nationalist intellectuals can only spread their ideas and 
nationalist movements can only mobilize large scale support, if they have access to 
such extended networks of communication. In these ways, both the form of identity 
 
92 Ibid., 369. 
93 Ibid., 370. 
94 Ibid., 381. 
95 Ibid., 405. 
proposed in nationalism and the social reach of nationalism may have something to 
do with the emergence of modern systems of communication96. 
However, there is one crucial weakness in the approach. Intensified 
communications between individuals and groups can as often lead to an increase in 
internal conflict as well as to an increase in solidarity. What is more, such conflict or 
solidarity might be expressed in forms other than nationalist ones. One is forced to go 
further and inquire under what conditions can such forms of internal communication 
lead to an increase in conflict as solidarity in nationalist terms97. 
The structure of communications does not directly indicate what those types 
of conflict are and therefore cannot in itself provide us with much idea about what 
kinds of nationalism will develop. 
The Marxist approach could not also be detoured. One cannot say Marxism 
failed to concentrate upon the issue of conflict. It is the way that conflict is conceived 
and related to nationalism that one can criticize. 
Most Marxists would probably agree that nationalism is a modern 
phenomenon associated with the rise of capitalism. This development produces new 
classes and class relationships. These classes with more extensive interrelationships 
that had existed before with a greater degree of physical concentration along with a 
system of politics which did not arise directly out of economic relations, had to engage 
in politics in new ways. Control of the state depended much more than previously 
upon securing the active support and consent of the majority of the population. Mass 
politics and its accompanying ideologies had to find alternative appeals to that of 
class. Nationalism is the major alternative98.  
An approach that focuses upon internal class conflict in a certain society has 
three options. It can regard nationalism as the work and expression of a single class, 
with relatively little involvement by other classes. It can regard nationalism in terms 
of a set of class alliances in which each class has its own rational interests, and it may 
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also consider it as the expression of interests of a particular class but inducing other 
classes to support that nationalism99. 
As regards the first kind of nationalism, it is true that one does sometimes 
encounter avowedly nationalist movements with a very narrow social basis, but their 
nationalist ideology is so clearly self-serving that it does not merit serious investigation 
in its own right. In such cases it is not necessary to abandon explicit class analysis. 
Nationalism can at best, serve the function of helping that class acquire a greater 
sense of solidarity and co-ordination100. 
The second possibility is more important. An example might be the allegedly 
common interests of the bourgeoisie and the working class in removing pre-capitalist 
classes from power and setting up a constitutional state in which capitalism can 
advance at maximum speed. What remains difficult to understand is why such politics 
does not organize itself in the form of a set of class alliances, with each class indicating 
its particular interest in the alliance. And why instead, should the various classes 
employ a nationalist ideology and organization which seems to obscure their rational 
basis of politics? Certainly, when Marx and Engels called for class alliances they were 
thinking of alliances between political groups, representing the interests of each class. 
One answer might be that at the relatively early stage of capitalism, in which 
this alliance occurs, the class divisions were incompletely developed, so that a class-
based ideology is less attractive than a populist one which can take a nationalist form. 
Another answer might be that it is psychologically naïve to expect mass politics to 
proceed in the form of rational alliances, that to mobilize enthusiasm and popular 
support something more is required, and that can be supplied by nationalism. 
A third answer might be that each class produces its own variant of 
nationalism- there is no single nationalism in a multi-class nationalist movement- and 
that nationalism is simply the lowest common denominator of these variants. 
However nationalist ideology often contradicts class ideology and organization. The 
question still remains. Why such classes have to resort to nationalism in the first place. 
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It could be argued that the conditions under which such multi-class alliances could be 
formed and sustained are fairly specific. Yet nationalism with a multi-class support 
appears as a general feature in modern politics101. This option attracts the most 
attention102. 
The writer feels the need to stress out the origin of the ideas on state and 
nation. Carl Schmitt103 believes that “all significant concepts of the modern theory of 
state are secularized theological concepts, not only because of their historical 
development- in which they were transformed from theology to the theory of state 
whereby the omnipotent god became the omnipotent lawgiver- but also because of 
their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological 
consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the 
miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the manner 
in which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in the last centuries. 
The idea of the modern constitutional state triumphed together with deism, a 
theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world104. This theology 
and metaphysics rejected not only the transgression of the laws of nature through an 
exception brought about by direct intervention as is found in the idea of a miracle, but 
also the sovereign’s direct intervention in a valid legal order105. It is not worth 
mentioning that the rationalism of the Enlightenment rejected the exception in every 
form”106. 
Schmitt argues that sovereign is he who decides on the exception. Only for him 
the definition of a borderline concept can be just. Contrary to what is believed, a 
borderline concept is not a vague concept, but one pertaining to the outermost 
sphere.  This definition of sovereignty leaves no other choice but to be associated with 
a case of this kind and not with routine. He claims “it is clear that the exception should 
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be understood as referring to a general concept in the theory of the state and not 
merely to a construct applied to any emergency degree or state of siege”107. 
The assertion that the exception is truly appropriate for the juristic definition 
of sovereignty has a systematic, legal-logical foundation. The decision on the 
exception is a decision in the true sense of the word. Because a general norm, as 
represented by an ordinary legal prescription, is unable to engulf a total exception, 
the decision that a real exception exists cannot there- fore be entirely derived from 
this norm108. When Robert von Mohl109 said that “the test of whether an emergency 
exists cannot be a juristic one”110, he assumed that a decision in the legal sense must 
be derived entirely from the content of a norm. But this is the question. In the general 
sense in which Mohl articulated his argument, his notion is only an expression of 
constitutional liberalism and fails to apprehend the independent meaning of the 
decision111. 
 From a practical or a theoretical perspective, it really makes no difference 
whether an abstract scheme advanced to define sovereignty (in other words, that 
sovereignty is the highest power, not a derived power) is acceptable. About an 
abstract concept there will in general be no argument, least of all in the history of 
sovereignty. What is argued about is the concrete application, and that means who is 
he who defines what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public 
safety and order, le salut public, and so on, when conflict arises. The exception, which 
is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of a 
grave danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be circumscribed 
factually and made to conform to a preformed law112. 
 It is precisely the exception that makes the subject of sovereignty relevant, 
that is, the whole question of sovereignty. The precise details of an emergency cannot 
be anticipated, nor is anyone in position to predict what may take place in such a case, 
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especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and of how it is to be 
eliminated. The precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional competence in 
such a case must necessarily be unlimited. From the liberal constitutional point of 
view, there would be no jurisdictional competence at all. The most guidance the 
constitution can provide is to indicate who can act in such a case. If such action is not 
subject to controls, if it is not hampered in some way by checks and balances, as is the 
case in a liberal constitution, then it is clear who the sovereign is. He decides whether 
there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it. Although 
he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, 
because the decision of the suspension of the constitution in its entirety lies solely to 
his hands. All tendencies of modem constitutional development point toward 
eliminating or bypassing the sovereign in this sense113. The ideas of Hugo Krabbe and 
Hans Kelsen are in line with this development. But whether the extreme exception can 
be banished from the world is not a juristic question. Whether one has confidence and 
hope that it can be eliminated depends on philosophical, especially on philosophical-
historical or metaphysical, convictions114. 
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                                      2b. Pan-movements 
 
 “Megali Idea” or Pan- Hellenism, which will be presented later on, did not 
stand alone in the 19th century world. There were other similar movements at the time 
of nationalist rise through Europe. Through comparison, these movements will allow 
us to better understand the Greek one, but also assess the events of that turbulent 
era, whose consequences can still be seen today. In this effort, I will occupy myself 
with the main Pan-movements of the 19th and 20th century. 
Pan-Slavism is a movement based on the conviction that all speakers of Slavic 
languages belong to a single nation115. It was a product of the second half of the 19th 
century, and it was a movement that was considered to be of lethal danger for the 
Greek nation. This fact led to the evolution of the Greek nationalism itself116. Despite 
its definition, Pan-Slavism is a diffuse and an ambivalent phenomenon117.   On the one 
hand it is a movement in which nationalist elements are mingled with supra-national 
and often imperialist trends. It was a result of the political awakening of the 
intellectuals in Central and Eastern Europe, a by-product of the French Revolution and 
the Napoleonic Wars. But even more decisive was the influence of German 
romanticism and of a linguistic Pan-Germanism as presented by Arndt and Fichte. Pan-
Slavism proclaimed the affinity of peoples despite any differences, with language 
being the only criterion. It could thus arise only at a time when under the influence of 
Herder, the national language was regarded as a determining factor for man’s loyalty 
and the course of his intellectual and spiritual life. Herder himself proclaimed the Slavs 
the coming leaders of Europe118. 
On the other hand, Pan-Slavism was never a serious political proposition and 
was never considered as such by any of the Tsars. Some like Serbian bishop Nikolaj 
Velimirovich even claimed that there was no Pan-Slavism at all and that it was 
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invented by the Pan-Germanists119. However, a possible realization of the theory 
terrorized Western Europe in the years before the Crimean War, a terror caused 
primarily by the existence and power of Russia. This fear was caused not by Russian 
acts but mainly because of Russia’s separateness, inaccessibility and its domestic 
policy.120 
Reality though was different. Pan-Slavism could not be exercised regularly by 
Russia for it was a policy which would inevitably lead to war against the Ottomans and 
the Habsburgs, if not the European powers in general. It was actually a revolutionary 
strategy directed against legitimate states. For the Russian empire to promote the 
principle of insurrectionary nationalism was to say the least double-edged121. 
In addition, one has to bear in mind that the rest of the Slavs, especially those 
of the Balkans had their own nationalism and did not look that much up to Russia. “No 
one of the smaller Slav peoples was, in fact, really friendly to the Russian pretensions 
to the hegemony of the Slavs”122, something that was crystal clear in the First Slav 
Congress in Prague in 1848, where Russian expansionism was rejected, since for some 
Russian Pan-Slavs, Pan-Slavism was an extension of Russian nationalism123.      
Pan-Germanism propagates the unity of the German race. Though not all 
coherent, its foundation is solid. The idea of strengthening the bond that tied all 
Germans to their fatherland excited sympathy and even received approval from the 
emperor himself124. Pan-Germanism was the expression of a national determination 
to preserve and strengthen the corporate life of a great people. The motives were 
greed from one point of view, ambition from another, but its effective cause in both 
cases was the expression of nationality. Germany had attained national 
consciousness, a national individuality and sought to make sure a lasting existence of 
this corporate for all time. Pan-Germanism was merely self-preservation125. 
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There was a strong feeling of limitation, as Germany shortly before World War 
I did not have more arable land than in 1815, whereas its needs had grown massively, 
and the Germanic race occupied the same space as in 1500126. A strong duality can be 
therefore detected. Pan-Germanism was in the first place seen as a means of escaping 
the pressure of France and Russia, both bent to its destruction according to the 
German point of view and in the second place it was an offensive oratory steered  
against England, its object, the conquest of English possessions in the Mediterranean 
and Asia127.  It was in the realm of Pan-Germanism that the foundation for Lebensraum 
and Drang nach Osten -as expressed by Friedrich List-, of the later Nazi regime, were 
laid128. 
The idea however was utopian. First, the Germans of all peoples at the time 
were the most easily denationalized not only in a political, but in a wider sense. It was 
not at all easy to keep one German in heart under foreign control129. Secondly, World 
War I proved that the overthrowing of England was more or less unachievable. 
The next Pan-movement examined is that of Pan-Turkism. It is a romantic 
political ideology first developed in Europe in the 19th century. It served the Great 
Powers’ policy in the Eurasian political scene. It was largely formed by Zıya Gökalp and 
its core lies in the vision of the unification of the Turkic nations130. 
The central point of Pan-Turkism is the “oğuzluk” (uguism or turkomania), 
which means the dream of the unification of the Uguz131. The majority of historians 
today identify that the people that invaded Asia Minor were the Uguz or a part of 
them. That is also what the early Ottoman chronicles refer to Uguz Khan, the mythical 
ancestor of the modern-day Turks left as a mortgage to his people the march against 
the Rum (Byzantium). It is even mentioned that the first Ottomans were subjects of 
the Seljuk family. This part of the Uguz was left to plunder Asia Minor, in order to drive 
their violent nomad brothers out of the Seljuk Iranian territory, and eventually 
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established itself there. Despite the fact that after 1923 the Uguz of Asia Minor are 
politically identified with the Turks (due to the name change), this identification does 
not go beyond the 20th century and despite the Pan-Turkist theory in any case does it 
apply during the Great Turkic Khaganate132. During the 1st (552-651) and the 2nd (685-
744) Turkic Khaganate the ethnonyms Uguz and Turk were not used as synonyms, but 
they expressed different political entities and realities133. From a political perspective, 
the Turkic nations were never united, at least in the way the Pan-Turkist theory 
believes they did134. 
Moving beyond what is mentioned above though, the initial phase of the active 
Pan-Turkism can be traced in the beginning of the 20th century in the crumbling 
Ottoman Empire. As a cultural phenomenon it appeared in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, being found in a “debate” against Pan-Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism135. 
At the same time the Pan-Turk ideology was gaining ground among the Tatars and 
other Turkic groups in Russia. Pan-Turkism was a by- product of Turkish nationalism, 
grown at first by the intellectuals136. 
Yusuf Akçura, a dedicated Pan-Turkist137, considered the world of the Turks as 
an indivisible entity, with evident signs of both cultural ties (language, history, 
customs) and material bonds (blood, race). The term “Turk” referred to all those of 
Turkic origin i.e. the Tatars, Azeris, Kirghiz, Yakuts and others. To all these he applied 
the term nation (millet) and argued persuasively for joint action in a common cause. 
However, Pan-Turkism was just one of the ideologies that existed in the Ottoman 
empire. Its largely intellectual character, especially among the Turkic groups of Russia, 
and its lack of organization lead to its failure. Even though it was adopted by the Young 
Turks in the final years of the empire, it never replaced well established ideologies 
within the committee of Progress and Union138. 
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Pan-Islam is a different story. In the late 19th century most of Islam was under 
alien rule. Great Britain and France are the two chief Mohammedan Powers, 
dominating in a sense much of the Muslim world, having between them something 
like one hundred million Islamic subjects. The main idea was that Islam, once the 
greatest militant power in the world and ruler of half Europe, had entirely lost vitality, 
and that Islamic states were bound to decay. However, The Sultan of Turkey, a key 
player in the Pan-Islam movement, had succeeded in securing from the entire 
orthodox Mohammedan world the recognition of his position as Calif. Having won this, 
he was seeking excuses and finding opportunities to exercise and broaden his 
influence in a manner which was embarrassing and alien to other Mohammedan 
Powers. The position had been complicated by the ambitions of Germany (a non-
Mohammedan Power), who for its own ends had acquired considerable influence with 
the Sultan139. 
 At the same time, it was reactionary in its internal policy, so that it is 
impossible to regard him as the protagonist of a progressive Islamic revival. Moreover, 
many fiery Pan-Islamists (like those of India) had reached a high state of civilization 
under foreign rule, and were not that willing to accept or claim a change in their 
political status  for the sake of preserving  their religion in its full purity and the 
demonstration of its good qualities to the world.  
At the opposite extreme of this religious revival movement were the fanatical 
brotherhoods, such as the Senoussi, who were conducting an extraordinarily 
successful campaign in Africa, and spreading Islam by the most energetic means, being 
the most dangerous factor in the Pan-Islamic propaganda140.  
Pan-ideologies may be diverse, and therefore difficult to compare, yet they 
share common traits. They have certain affinities to nationalism, imperialism and 
irredentism, share an ambiguous relationship to modernity, the state and the West, 
and their anxieties and fears often coincide or have a similar starting point. They are 
also essentialist by constructing a mythical concept of the pan-group, which is 
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supposed to transcend all other aspects of identity, and illiberal: membership in the 
pan-group is not optional (in the sense of the "daily plebiscite" as the basis of the 
French nation). Lastly, pan-ideologies are notoriously vague when it comes to defining 
goals and individual aims: they strive for paradise but are unwilling – or unable – to 
define what "paradise" is. They believe that the road to paradise has only been 
ordained by fate for their pan-group and thus are also deterministic141. They could be 
described as highly populist, “empty” but at the same time extremely appealing 
ideologies. 
Pan-ideologies are strongly connected with both nationalism and empire. In 
fact, in most cases pan-ideologies bridge the gap between the two. Other pan-
ideologies are created out of the context of colonialism and justify, organize and bring 
about anti-colonial struggle. Another one of their common traits is irredentism. Pan-
ideologies are “annoyed” and dissatisfied with existing political realities and attempt 
to change them, usually by stirring up discontent among members of the "pan-group" 
living under foreign domination, claiming that these should be joined to one "mother-
state." This irredentist nature of pan-ideologies may also provide an explanation as to 
why they have rarely managed to become official state policy. They have only 
prevailed in periods of international turmoil where war – the almost inevitable 
outcome of a propagation of a pan-ideology by a state – made significant changes in 
the world's territorial make-up possible142. 
Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) regarded pan-movements as “particularly 
aggressive forms of Volk-Nationalisms”, referring to pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism 
as examples143. Yet, in fact, nationalism and pan-movements frequently have a rather 
uneasy relationship. Many pan-movements would be inconceivable without the 
presence of a modern nationalism, a nationalism which strives to achieve a nation 
state where the population is either in the majority or completely identical with "the 
nation". Pan-movements of this kind will go along with the national struggle, yet 
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inevitably find themselves frustrated once the state has finally been created. It is only 
then that nationalism and pan-movements part ways144. 
Despite their differences at first sight, Pan-Ideologies were a product of their 
time, thus sharing common foundation and characteristics.  They may emphasize on 
different elements, having a more racial or political basis such as that “Megali Idea”145, 
or highlighting maximalist claims like Pan-Germanism146, focusing on linguistic criteria 
in the case of Pan-Turkists147, or even having a religious starting point, but the reality 
is that all these movements are capable of many variations and inconsistencies, and 
one distinguishing symptom bringing them all together is a tendency for 
megalomania148. 
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                                         2c. “The Megali Idea” 
Immediately after the creation of the Greek state in 1830, the Greeks believed 
it was obvious that they had to liberate their brothers still under Ottoman yoke and 
expand the territory of the state in lands that had rebelled against the Turks but had 
been left out149 and were once Greek according to their perception. The core of 
“Megali Idea” is the liberation of the enslaved brothers150.  About thirty years after 
Kolettis’ speech in the parliament151, Charles Tuckerman, the US Minister to Greece at 
the time, defined “Megali Idea” as follows152: “Briefly defined the Great Idea means 
that the Greek mind is to regenerate the East—that it is the destiny of Hellenism to 
Hellenize that vast stretch of territory which by natural laws the Greeks believe to be 
theirs, and which is chiefly inhabited by people claiming to be descended from Hellenic 
stock, professing the Orthodox or Greek faith, or speaking the language”. 
This project targeted all the Balkan and Anatolian Orthodox who were willing 
to adopt Hellenic culture and language. The complex and diverse reality of the 
Ottoman Rum millet was co-opted in favour of a nationalist ideology which hailed the 
renaissance of a Hellenic nation that aspired to a leading role, as well as a mission 
civilatrice in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The territorial 
expansion of Greece against Ottoman Balkan territories required a flexible approach 
towards local Christian populations, which often spoke Albanian, Bulgarian or Vlach. 
Bringing together these populations was a key element for the success of Greek 
expansionist strategies, so ethnic nationalism could not fit. Overlooking the element 
of language and ethnicity was in any case compatible with the millet legacy153. 
“Megali Idea” is not something new in the first decades of the life of the state. 
It exists from the Fall of Constantinople and is nothing more than the ideological 
expression of a movement for the creation of Greater Greece, that would include the 
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territories of the Byzantine empire, and was undoubtedly linked with the legend of 
the marble king154. It was a vague schema as regards territory, since the Byzantine 
itself did not have specific borders. In any case the border was the “red apple tree” of 
the legend, somewhere deep in Asia Minor, and the Balkans in a European framework. 
“Megali Idea” included different elements that shaped its form, through the 
years. There were solid Greek populations within the Ottoman empire that kept alive 
a tradition purely Greek in contrast with the Turks (Pontus, Cappadocia etc.). Some of 
them continue an old tradition that became a national element after the Turkish 
conquest, resisting to it (Pontus, Cappadocia, Constantinople, Eastern Thrace, Cyprus) 
and others were formed during the Ottoman rule for specific reasons (Greeks of 
Western Asia Minor, Greeks of the Principalities). 
 The Greek broker capital had transactions in the Balkans and Asia Minor. Thus, 
it could not accept as Greek state the one that was formed in 1830, since it had no 
interest in this region. There could not be a state that did not include its region of 
interest. 
 The orthodox patriarchate played a catalytic role in the shaping of “Megali 
Idea”. For the patriarchate there was no other solution than the resurrection of the 
Byzantine Empire. 
 The involvement of the minorities in the Ottoman state machine, and the 
important role the Greek intellectuals played, encouraged “Megali Idea”, since even 
them expected the reestablishment of the Byzantine empire155.   
 The main exponent of the movement was Ioannis Kolettis, especially after his 
famous speech156 in 1843 and that is exactly when the more realistic basis of “Megali 
Idea” is set. He believed, as well as King Otto, that the liberation of Greek provinces 
was possible through the incitement of revolutionary movements and the use of 
appropriate and flexible diplomatic acts, having in mind the favorable international 
circumstances. 
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One might say that the driving force of the Greek state went through three faces. The 
first one propagated a gradual Hellenization of the Ottoman Empire and the revival of 
Byzantium. This approach, though diminished after 1821, still had supporters until the 
First Balkan War. 
 The second phase included the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire through a 
synergy of the Balkan peoples and its replacement with a federal state in which the 
Greek element would have a leading place due to its economic and cultural 
superiority. This reminds us a lot of Riga’s points157. 
 The third face is the one described above under Kolettis and Otto. It was based 
upon a tense irredentist policy aimed towards the territorial integration of the Greek 
state. There was a realistic plan formed, in which there was a minimum of territorial 
claims. 
It must be noted that due to the weakness of the Greek kingdom and the Great 
Powers policy, “Megali Idea” could not be achieved in its initial phases. Things got 
even worse after 1854 and the failed revolutionary movements, Russia’s turn towards 
Pan- Slavism and the Revolution in Crete (1866-1869). Greek foreign policy was forced 
to adapt more realistic orientations and seek the necessary as it was proven peaceful 
and friendly coexistence with the Ottoman empire. It was also clear that the economic 
and cultural rise of the enslaved Greeks, coupled with the military and fiscal 
strengthening of the young state was the only way to deal with the military failures 
but also the Bulgarian penetration in Macedonia158. 
The evolutionary interpretation of “Megali Idea” went through a new phase, 
with the concretion of the two national centers, Constantinople and Athens through 
Greco-ottomanism159. One can talk about the emergence of a new irredentist ideology 
in the beginning of the 20th century. Its aim was the reformation of the empire the 
coexistence of Greek and Ottoman element. A. Souliotis-Nikolaidis and I. Dragoumis 
(Organisation of Constantinople) envisioned the transformation of the empire to a 
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multi-ethnic federation, where the connecting point would be the common cultural 
bonds of the East160. 
Souliotis believed in the presence of many nations inside a federation which 
would ultimately take a supranational character with the creation of an Eastern race. 
After Venizelos’s arrival we have a continuation of the Greco-Turkish approach as a 
result of the circumstances of the time161. He had sincerely believed in the possibility 
of coexistence within the Ottoman territory and even admitted that he would not have 
gone to war in 1912 against Turkey, if the Cretan issue had been solved162.   
Of course, as it soon became apparent, the hope of coexistence was utopian, 
and would be proven as such in the most painful way possible, the Asia Minor 
Catastrophe in 1922. 
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              2d. The modern Greek nation and the Greek nation-state 
  
Ever since the founding of the Greek state in 1830, a long debate has been 
going on about the beginning of modern Hellenism and modern Greeks. Fallmerayer’s 
study163 triggered a rush towards this direction.  Many historians and scholars in 
general, tried to distinguish the elements of the Greek identity as well as its influences 
in an attempt to discredit Fallmerayer’s claims. Prince Clemens Von Metternich on a 
letter to a Hungarian nobleman, Prince Paul Esterhazy on 21st September 1829164 
inquired “What do we mean by the Greeks? Do we mean a people, a country, or a 
religion? If either of the first two, where are the dynastic and geographical boundaries? 
If the third, then upwards of fifty million men are Greeks…”165. This is just a small 
indication of the task they were up to, but also the complexity and obscurity of who 
was to be called Greek and what it meant to call oneself as such.   
Much of the Greek identity is based on the classical heritage. This is partly 
thanks to western science. This heritage was known to Greeks long before the struggle 
for independence in 1821 and became even more evident after the establishment of 
the Greek state166. It goes without saying that after 1830 Greeks devoted themselves 
to their classical heritage. Despite neglecting to refer to certain aspects of their roots, 
the continuity in Greek history, racial origin, language and culture is undisputed167. 
The study of folkloristics provides further arguments. Greek folk tradition and its Slavic 
counterpart share many common customs that can be traced to the pre-Christian era 
and became corpus of the Orthodox Church and were thus transferred to the Slavs. If 
those customs had vanished, they could not have been transferred to the Slavs, whose 
folk tradition, despite the common elements is distinct from the Greek one168. 
Another important aspect of the Greek identity is Byzantium. The Byzantine 
empire was without doubt the one that preserved the ancient world through the 
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clergy169. Despite the latter’s enmity towards the ancient spirit, it saved it and brought 
it to today. Greeks have inherited byzantine Greece as well, its roots going deep into 
the Hellenistic world, which in its turn had its roots in classical Greece. It is undisputed 
that Greeks are closer to byzantine rather than classical Greece. This is because 
byzantine era Greece was the living past thanks to the church170. In this framework, 
there have been attempts to “Hellenize” the Eastern Roman Empire, either because 
the nineteenth-century Greek Romanticism (through Spyridon Zampelios and 
Constantinos Paparrigopoulos) constructed Byzantium as the medieval phase of the 
primordial “Hellenic” nation or because a segment of the byzantine intelligentsia used 
the term “Hellene” to identify themselves, especially in the last two centuries of the 
empire171. 
  This duality was the cause for a “struggle” between the two traditions that 
was not limited to a theoretical framework. The dispute could be found in different 
groups of Greeks, each one highlighting the byzantine or the classical one. In any case, 
classical heritage became stronger and stronger until it became the dominant, though 
not the only force in modern Greek history172. After all, 1453, a milestone of the Greek 
“existence” was a date that saw no change in the way Greeks perceived themselves, 
a continuity rather than a break; this is also why the Fall of Constantinople does not 
mark the beginning of the “modern period” of Greek history173.  
Before one decides to take up the modern Greek identity issue it is imperative 
that he occupies himself with the Greek Millet or Millet-i-Rum. The Millet-i-Rum 
embraced all the Christians subjects of the Sultan and reflected in microcosm the 
ethnic heterogeneity of the empire itself174. It contained Serbs, Romanians, 
Bulgarians, Vlachs, Orthodox Albanians and Arabs, while the strictly Greek element, 
although firmly in control of the millet through its stranglehold over the Ecumenical 
 
169 Ibid., 24. 
170 Ibid., 25. 
171 Livanios, Dimitris, “The Quest for Hellenism,” 36. 
172 Dakin, Douglas, Η ενοποίηση της Ελλάδας 1770-1923, 25. 
173 Livanios, Dimitris, “The Quest for Hellenism,” 35. 
174 Braude B., and Lewis B., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 185. 
Patriarchate was by no means homogenous. The millets were formally formed after 
1453175, with the Rum millet being the largest one176. 
It is interesting to note that during the Ottoman Empire, the “nation” was 
Orthodoxy and the “fatherland” was the lands of the Orthodox. In this context, 
“Hellenic” as it was used by Scholarios177 is just another word for Christian 
“Oecumene”. This could be termed as the “national character” of the “nation”. 
Christians however had a name for it: Genos [ Γένος plural: Γένη] is a word that 
linguistically carries connotations of lineage through blood and ancestry and remains 
notoriously untranslatable178.  It started life in the Byzantine Empire as Γένος των 
Ρωμαίων (of the Romans) or γένος των Χριστιανών (of the Christians), but in many 
instances remained unaccompanied by adjectives and other appellations. It was the 
one single word used throughout the period of the Ottoman rule by the Greek-
speaking Christians to denote the wider community they thought they belonged to179.   
The question of homogeneity is quite perplexed. Many Turkish speaking 
Christians referred to themselves as “Christians” or “Christians inhabiting the East” 
(Anadol etrafında sakın olan Hırıstıyanlar). Furthermore, the existence in Istanbul and 
in the Orthodox eparchies of Nicaea, Nicomidia and Chalcedon of communities of 
Armenian speaking “Greeks” who employed the Greek alphabet to write Armenian, 
further complicated matters. Another element of ambiguity though outside the Millet-
i-Rum stemmed from the Cryptochristians. Substantial numbers were to be found in 
Southern Albania, in Crete, in Cyprus and above all in Pontus where their numbers ran 
into many thousands180. 
The Greeks were always the dominant ethnic group in the Millet-i-Rum, just as 
the millet itself appears to have enjoyed a tacit precedence over the other millets181. 
The millet system evolved throughout the empire’s lifetime but in the 19th century it 
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began to crumble. The initial onslaught on the power and the pretensions of the millet 
and its leaders i.e. the Patriarchate, the  Holy Synod, Fanariotes, koçabasıs came from 
Greeks who with their growing network of commercial ties with Western Europe and 
with their cultural ascendency within the Orthodox millet, were more susceptible to 
nationalist and rationalist currents emanating from Western Europe182. It was the 
emergence of the independent Greek state in 1830 which rendered inevitable the 
eventual demise of the Millet-i-Rum, although it was formally to survive for almost 
another century183. 
In the latter 19th century the Millet-i-Rum turned from a grouping that 
embraced all Orthodox inhabitants of the Ottoman empire into one that was largely 
but still by no means ethnically Greek. This was due to a number of reasons. Soon after 
the founding of the Greek state, its church was declared Autocephalous in 1833, and 
in the same decade the Ecumenical Patriarchate was forced to accept the de facto 
autonomy of the Serbian church together with the Serbianization of its hierarchy. 
After the collapse of the Phanariot regime in the Danubian lands, the Rumanian church 
was reorganized, and its autonomy was recognized in 1885. The major blow however 
was the Bulgarian Exarchate founded in 1870. The Patriarch responded with an 
anathema to the Exarchate in 1872, lifted only in 1945. The condition that dioceses 
could place themselves under the jurisdiction of the Exarchate provided that two-
thirds of their members had voted to do so inaugurated forty years of bitter strife 
between Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs in Macedonia184. 
The formal demise of the Millet-i-Rum should be dated to March 1919 on the 
eve of the Greek occupation of the West coast of Asian Minor, when the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate formally released Ottoman Greeks from their civic responsibilities as 
Ottoman citizens. Almost a century after the Greek War of Independence, the 
privileged status of the millet was unilaterally abrogated by its temporal and 
ecclesiastical leader185.       
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It is interesting to see the evolution of the Greek national identity starting from 
Regas Velestinlis. Greek nationalism was heavily influenced in its initial stages by the 
French Republican nationalism. The fusion of French civic ideals and the millet 
tradition did not allow ethnicity to become a defining element of Greek identity during 
the Neohellenic Enlightenment and the Independence War years186. In Regas’ work 
the boundary mechanism the delineation for the Greek national identity was 
voluntaristic and deduced its symbols from republican political values and institutions. 
The “other” in the civic nation he envisioned was the Ottoman ancient regime. 
Christians, Muslims, Jews adherents of French republican forces were invited to join 
forces and overthrow the despotic empire187. The aim was the creation of a republic 
based on reason and a civic form of Hellenic civilization. 
This civic conceptualization of the Greek national identity did not prevail, as 
millet- based divisions proved much stronger. The boundary mechanism remained 
voluntaristic but within the Rum millet. It just became more restrictive, as culture and 
language were added to political values as key symbolic resources. All Balkan 
Christians were invited and theoretically welcomed to partake in the Hellenic culture, 
learn Greek and thus become eligible for Greek citizenship188. The importance of 
learning Greek is highlighted in several literary works of the Neohellenic 
Enlightenment. Some of them aimed specifically to the proliferation of Greek among 
non-Greek-speaking Christians189. 
Refocusing on the Rum millet meant that Christianity was a basic and solid 
identity criterion of the Greek nation. Therefore, the boundary drawn did not only 
exclude the despotic Ottoman Empire, but also its Muslim subjects. This fitted 
Ottoman social divisions and was of course easier to spread. According to Article 2§2 
of the Constitution promulgated on 1 January 1822 at the First Revolutionary National 
Assembly in Epidaurus, “the autochthonous residents of the Greek territory who 
believe in Jesus Christ are Greeks enjoy all the civil rights without any limitation and 
difference”. Greek citizenship included in other words an open invitation to all 
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Ottoman Christians who were willing to join the revolutionary cause, regardless of 
their ethnic descent or mother tongue. Apart from the endurance of millet allegiances, 
this also reflected the diversity of the ethno-linguistic map of Ottoman Balkans. 
Through the appropriation of Greek language and culture, Balkan and Anatolian 
Christians could hope to become full members of the Greek nation190. 
While culture and language were recognized as key pillars of Greek national 
identity, their content was disputed. Adamantios Korais, arguably the most influential 
intellectual of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, claimed that to reach its ancient glory, 
the Greek nation had to rid itself of all Ottoman and Byzantine influences which had 
kept it aloof from all intellectual developments in Western Europe, recover its ancient 
culture and establish a secular state under the name of ‘Hellas’191. The establishment 
of the terms ‘Hellas’ and ‘Hellene’ had a major symbolic significance. In Korais’ view, 
Orthodoxy was not an incontrovertible element of Greek national identity; on the 
contrary, it was an obstacle to the nation’s modernization. In a similar vein, Korais 
championed a comprehensive language reform so that the vernacular Greek language 
would be relieved from all its medieval Ottoman and Byzantine influences. The new 
idiom called ‘katharevoussa’ would be literally ‘pure’ of all foreign traces and 
adulterations192. 
Korais’ complete rejection of Greece’s medieval heritage was not followed by 
Konstantinos Paparregopoulos, the most influential Greek historian of the nineteenth 
century. In his magnus opus ‘History of the Greek Nation’193, Paparregopoulos 
attempted to reconcile ancient Greek and Byzantine historical legacies through the 
introduction of a ‘Hellenic-Christian synthesis’. He also adopted the periodization of 
Greek history into ancient, medieval and modern, first suggested by the historian 
Spyridon Zambelios. In contrast to Korais, who had dismissed Orthodoxy, 
Paparregopoulos subjugated Orthodoxy to Greek nationalism and made it a key 
element of Greek national identity. Despite the universalistic message of Orthodoxy 
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which was then advanced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the newly- established 
Church of Greece facilitated the transformation of Orthodoxy into a cultural tool for 
the consolidation of Greek nationalism. In the nationalist visions of both Korais and 
Paparregopoulos, language and culture remained major symbolic resources for the 
definition of Greek national identity. The delineation of the boundaries of Greek 
national identity remained voluntaristic within the borders of the Rum millet. This was 
necessary due to the launch of an ambitious nationalist project194. “Megali Idea” 
espoused the ‘re-civilization” of the Near East through the expansion of Greece. 
Through the recovery of Byzantine territories lost to the Ottomans including its capital 
and the restoration of a Hellenic Empire over the Ottoman territories, Greece would 
fulfil its mission civilisatrice.195 
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               2e. Pontic Greek Identity and the Modern Greek Nation 
 
The Greek population of the Southern Black Sea coast i.e. Pontic Greeks is a 
particular case among the Greek populations living outside mainland Greece. The 
geographic isolation and distance from powerful Greek centers, enriched their culture 
with some unique characteristics and as will be later presented, gave birth to some 
unlikely exceptions. 
The first question to be answered is what are the elements of the Pontic 
identity and secondly, does this identity have a Greek orientation and character? 
Greek presence in Pontus dates back to the 7th century BC and the first colony of 
Miletus. Over the coming centuries the Greek element was a constant point of 
reference during the Roman and Byzantine empire. The late Byzantine era is one that 
is of great interest, since at the same time that Anatolia is being lost for Byzantium 
and consequently Hellenism, Pontus stands its ground. It is interesting to note that 
the Greek-orthodox element of Pontus was always part of the Greek “γένος” (genos). 
The term used for these people during the Byzantine and Ottoman times was 
“Ρωμαίος/Ρωμιός” (Roman), a term that still survives as self-distinguishing for the 
Greek-speaking Muslims of Pontus (εμείς πα Ρωμαίοι είμες- we are Romans). The 
Greeks of Pontus that had migrated to the Russian Caucasus during the 19th centuries 
called themselves “Ρωμαίοι-Romans” if they spoke Greek and “Rum/Urum” if they 
spoke Turkish196.  The word “Έλληνας-Hellene” followed in Pontus the same road as 
in the rest of the Greek-inhabited areas197 of Byzantine and later Ottoman empire198. 
The endurance of Pontic Hellenism lies to geography, village communities in 
the valleys and the commercial prosperity in the coast. The morphology of the region 
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has isolated even from antiquity the coast and the Greek trading stations on it- from 
Amisos (Samsun) to the west, to Bathys (Batumi) to the east- from central Anatolia, 
creating a culture of isolation. The northern slopes of the mountains that separate 
Pontus from Anatolia are densely forested and thus unattractive to the semi-nomadic 
Turkomans who first took their flocks to the edge of the Anatolian plateau and looked 
down upon the Pontic “sea of trees” (ağaç denizi). In other words, Pontus was well 
insulated from settlement coming from the interior, which in its turn meant that the 
process of Turkification was slow and protracted over centuries199. 
 Having experienced the collapse of Byzantine administration in Anatolia 
before and after 1071, Pontic Greeks were the most successful in ignoring the wider 
political facts of life in Anatolia. After all it was proven that the rural areas that were 
Greek and had the will to defend their lands managed to retain a local independence. 
For the Greeks of Pontus specifically the imperial Byzantine or Ottoman government 
in Constantinople might not, for most practical reasons, have existed200. Another 
important factor is that in Pontus Muslim settlement began up to four centuries later 
than in other regions, and it only lasted for about a century before the tide was turned 
in the 19th century201. Elsewhere Greeks tended to lose their language before their 
faith, and their faith before they stopped paying the haraç levy. The contribution of 
Ottoman bureaucracy and haraç assessors to the survival of Hellenism was in some 
areas crucial. It had been the Ottoman state that first adequately defined what a Greek 
was and assumed that his descendants would also be classified as “Rumı”. However, 
Anatolian Greeks lost ground geographically until the 19th century re-Hellenization. 
 Pontus on the other hand does not fall within these two categories. In at least 
two areas Greek language outlasted the Orthodox faith and in many more districts the 
Orthodox faith outlasted the haraç classification. Some crypto-Christians who 
declared Orthodoxy in 1856 might have had Muslim ancestors and were even enlisted 
for Muslim military service.  It is possible though difficult to prove, that Greek had 
become the elite language among some Muslim settlers. In 1850, George Finlay was 
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taken round Trebizond by a Greek-speaking Muslim who answered to the name of 
Demetris202. Finally, a look at Kiepert’s map of Greek-speaking villages in 1890203, will 
reveal that virtually all the areas of the medieval empire had been retained. In the 
highlands Greek settlement had even been extended204. 
The main source of “power” for Hellenism was the village communities in the 
interior. The coastal trading towns were more vulnerable to political and commercial 
change. But until a rift between urban and valley Greeks manifests itself in the late 
19th century, they drew much of their strength and continuity of Hellenism from the 
valleys. It is interesting to note that for travelers the cities always seemed to look 
outward towards the Black Sea, and in the two or three biggest cities there was a 
cosmopolitan air, which was hard to reconcile with the uncompromising interior. But 
the old Greek colonies of the coast shared a community of interest with the immediate 
interior, something unparalleled for among similar Greek cities of the Euxine coast. 
Each town was inextricably linked to its own valley, its private Greek hinterland205.  
Education is another factor that could not be omitted. Greek education went 
through various phases in Pontus during the long Ottoman rule. In the middle 15th 
century, after the Fall of Constantinople and Trebizond, a large number of scholars left 
the former Byzantine empire towards the West, joining those that had left prior to the 
Fall. Among them we should examine the life course of three different but esteemed 
Pontic Greek scholars. Cardinal Vissarion, Georgios of Trebizond and Georgios 
Amoiroutzis206. 
These three men each one from different ideological roots and different life 
paths tried to save their homeland, its people and culture. This included constant 
pleads to European monarchs and the Pope for the liberation of the Greeks in the case 
of Vissarion, the attempt to Christianize Mehmet II and consequently the Ottoman 
empire as Georgios of Trebizond envisioned and the intention to keep the identity of 
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the γένος (gender, nation) alive and create a field of understanding, between ruler 
and ruled207 as is the case with Amoiroutzis. Despite the criticism that existed even at 
their time, especially as far as Amoiroutzis is concerned208, these prominent scholars 
alongside others of course were the education beacons of Pontus in the years right 
before and after the end of Byzantium and the empire of Trebizond. 
However, situation got worse in Pontus as time went on. In the 16th century 
there were almost no teachers and scholars at all. At least until the early 17th century 
there was no way out of Pontus in this matter as the Greeks in the European part of 
the empire and Constantinople had. The very few scholars of that time came from the 
three Great monasteries. There were no schools but home teachers. Only in the late 
17th century a series of positive developments in the region like the short teaching of 
the high-valued scholar Sevastos Kiminitis, the founding of the Princely Academies in 
Bucharest and Jassy (Ιάσιο) gave a generous boost to the education in Pontus. In any 
case though, in those hard times the undisputed guardians and providers of education 
were the three monasteries, Panagia Soumela, St. Georgios Peristereota and St. 
Ioannis Vazelona209. Great milestones are undoubtedly the founding of the 
“frontistiria” in Trebizond in 1682 and Gümüşhane (Αργυρούπολη, Argyroupolis) in 
1723210. 
 During the 19th century we see that there is an increased demand for 
education in Pontus that leads Archbishop Parthenios to ask for finacial aid not for the 
needs of the church but for the education of the fold211. During the last decades of the 
century the increase of schools and students is impressive. The founding of new 
schools and the maintenance of existing ones was due to donations from Greeks in 
Pontus or Pontic Greeks that lived in Russia. The data available, with some reservation, 
talk about 507 Greek schools, 20.435 students and 543 teachers in 1890. By 1912 
schools were 1.050, teachers 1.230 and students rose, perhaps with some excess, to 
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75.000. The period between the late 19th and early 20th century is also the height of 
the “frontistirio” of Trebizond212. 
In the same framework one ought not to neglect the role of the church. For 
most Pontic Christians their relationship with the distant patriarchate were largely 
economic. They felt the burden of the peşkeş (monthly gift). The average Greek in the 
region was also made aware of his bishop’s legal and political position in the local 
government. The Greek core of Pontus is dominated by its great monasteries: 
Peristereota, Vazelon, Soumela and Choutoura. The forty or so villages that 
surrounded them remained unwavering in their faith from medieval until modern 
times. Among these villages, apostasy was inconceivable. In the Matsouka valley 
below Vazelon there are impressive records of the cultivation of the same fields by 
the same families under the same terms and using the same agricultural methods for 
up to six centuries213. 
It should be stated that it was a habit of the Greeks of Pontus after the end of 
the Russian-Turkish War in 1828-1829 to move to Russia after each conflict to avoid 
possible Ottoman retaliation. From 1828 to 1882 it is estimated that approximately 
95.100 Greeks migrated from Pontus to Russia214. Their numbers were fluctuant 
occasionally rising and falling until the breakout of the First World War. During its time, 
approximately 85.800 new Pontic Greeks found refuge in Russian territory215. 
During this period there were attempts to bring the immigrants to Greece. The 
national center had from late 19th century attempted to divert the wave of Pontic 
Greeks from Russia to Greece, in an attempt to become a point of reference for all the 
Greek orthodox populations of the Ottoman empire216. It seems that among the 
landless peasants that lived in isolated hostile villages the prospect of relocation in the 
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new Greek lands, at first in Epirus and Thessaly and later in Macedonia after the Balkan 
wars, was seen as the best solution217.  
Pontus was part of the ideal Greek space as early as the Greek revolution, and 
Pontic Greeks had taken part in revolutionary corps both from historic Pontus and 
Russia218. This is why Theodoros Negris claimed in 1823 that Pontic Greeks had earned 
the undisputed right to gain political rights in Greece219.  
Even from the 1870s, the Greek Association (Σύλλογος) founded in 1872 in 
Trabzon believed that the Greeks of Pontus should stay in their ancestral land. Had it 
however been impossible, the choice should preferably be Greece, but in any case, 
anywhere but Russia220.  The annexation of Thessaly to the Greek state (1881-1882) 
made this option more realistic221.  
According to Biliotti, the Greeks did not migrate to Russia out of sympathy for 
Russians but as the closest choice. Their hearts and sympathies were towards Greece, 
as long as they could find arable land and just a fraction of the facilitations provided 
by the Russian administration222. 
Greek government attempted to create a network of organized movement of 
Pontic Greeks in Thessaly, after 1878 and the end of the Russian-Ottoman war to 
prevent large masses of Greek populations to move towards Russia, since the St. 
Stephan Treaty provided facilitations to such movements223 . After the temporary 
abandonment of these plans, Macedonia was suggested. Its people had not shown, at 
least according to the Greek government, the necessary devotion to the Greek ideals. 
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Greek diplomats were surprised to see that the populations in Macedonia and Thrace 
preferred the immediate liberation from the Ottoman yoke rather than the unsure 
unification to Greece in the future. Even the devoted to Hellenism Bulgarian-speaking 
communities of Doirani, Giannitsa, Goumentza and Vodena, refused to sign protest 
letters against their inclusion to the Bulgarian state. In this framework, the prospect 
of the organized movement of Pontic Greeks of undisputed ethnism (εθνισμός) 
towards Macedonia, was seen as positive. 
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Charilaos Trikoupis reported to 
the Greek consul in Thessaloniki that many Pontic Greeks had asked the Greek consul 
of Trabzon for aid from the Greek government in order to migrate to Greece224. 
In the 1880s, resisting the Russification policy, organized in strong Greek 
communities, these Pontic Greeks kept their national identity alive, alongside their 
bonds with their fatherlands but also their ideological at least contact with the distant 
and idealized homeland, Greece225. 
Greece’s interest for the Greeks of Russia intensified during the next decades. 
After the Balkan wars, Venizelos’ emigration policy in Macedonia was an attempt to 
bring dynamic populations to the newly acquired territories. In this framework doctor 
Koutsodimitris was sent in 1914 in Russia to examine the wills of the Greeks and record 
the families that would be willing to move to Macedonia. Pontic Greeks of Russia 
expressed the will to come to Greece. It is estimated that 3.757 Pontic Greeks from 
Caucasus moved to Macedonia, many of which returned to Russia, disappointed by 
the situation in Macedonia226. It has to be stated though that before these events, 
some families from the Hant`ο and Meglis villages in Chalka had tasted the experience 
of emigration in Macedonia. Some of them returned to their villages in Caucasus 
because of the conditions they found227. 
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The national orientations of these populations can become further clearer if 
one reads the Greek newspapers during the Balkan wars. With the beginning of the 
war, the three most important newspapers (Κόσμος, Εθνική Δράσις, Αργοναύτης) 
present a complete ideological convergence. In an atmosphere of general national 
elan, took initiatives for the fund raising for the cause228. 
As far as Pontus itself is concerned,  Moricz’s ,Austrian consul in Trabzon, notes 
in 1914 are enlightening: “ For five days now it is rumored that Turkish women have 
told Greek merchants that their husbands do not allow them to shop from Greeks 
anymore, because they sent the money to the Greek fleet”229. 
Newspapers further suggest the sense of belonging to the Greek nation, Pontic 
Greeks had. An article in the newspaper “ Ελεύθερος Πόντος” (Free Pontus) printed in 
Batum in June 1919, after describing the unwavering devotion of the Pontic Greeks to 
Hellenism, calls the Greeks of Pontus not to lose their hopes for success and urges 
them to set the limestone of the Hellenic Republic of Komnenoi (της ελληνικής 
δημοκρατίας των Κομνηνών)230.  
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                 2f. Pontic Greek population: Facts and figures 
When it comes to Greeks of Pontus in general, the writer does not wish to tire 
with a long presentation of the population data but instead will present the most 
known censi and their information.  Perhaps the most known census is that of 1881-
1893231. It was carried out by French geographer Vital Cuinet232 and was criticized even 
from its publication233. According to the Ottoman division of Pontus, the Greeks were 
246.625. But if one adds the Greeks residing in the expanded boundaries of the area, 
then the total number rises to 278.925234. Cuinet’s work is even more strongly 
doubted by Turks today235. 
It seems however that this census despite its problems is still better than the 
Ottoman counterpart of the same period that lasted twelve years as well236. This 
census claimed that the Pontic Greeks were 193.733237. 
The second Ottoman census is that of 1905-06. In this the Greek population is 
estimated to 286.943238. Even more illuminating is the last ever Ottoman census of 
1914 based on the one mentioned above239. According to these the Greeks of Pontus 
were 335.946240.  What is interesting is that in these two censi the Greek population 
has a 50% rise in total. In some areas like the sancaks of Amasya, Karahısar Sarkı, Tokat 
and Sınop we are talking about an 85% rise, which cannot be explained by means of 
natural reproduction rates of a population241. 
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Greek statistics or statistics based on Greek data appear after 1870 and come 
from the Metropoleis of the Greek communities or the Greek consulates242.  Savvas 
Ioannides presented in 1870 the population of Pontus. In his work, Christian Greeks 
are 240.000 and Muslims 480.000 out of a total 1.000.000 inhabitants. Armenians 
were 120.000, Kirghiz were 100.000 and the Kurds along with other Muslim ethnicities 
were approximately 60.000243. When the ethnic criterion is involved though, numbers 
change. Ioannides claims that those of Greek ethnic origin reached 330.000, those of 
Ottoman- Turkish descent 250.000, Kirghiz 100.000, Armenian 140.000, Laz and 
Georgian 45.000, Türkmen 85.000 and Kurd, Persian etc. 50.000. However, it is not 
clear how he made this separation244. With these numbers also agree but  with small 
changes the statistics of Pericles Triantafyllides the same year, and the report of the 
Greek consul in Trebizond Napoleon Mpetsos245, and finally that of the French 
geographer Alexandre Syvrais, who gives a number of 320.000 Greeks in Pontus and 
Paphlagonia without particularly detailed data246. 
The next attempts were conducted under difficult conditions which affect their 
trustworthiness, like the last official Greek statistic in 1910247. The thoroughly 
discussed census of the Patriarchate is surrounded by contradiction248.Published in a 
book in 1919, it gives a number of 450.913 Greeks in the Pontus region249.  Finally, the 
American King Crane report in the Paris Peace Conference, places the Greek number 
in 400.000250. 
It is hard and perhaps even impossible for one to deduct safe and accurate 
numbers, since the numbers have been exploited but more importantly there are 
many factors that cause obscurity and greatly impair our ability to extract solid results. 
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Therefore, caution is mandatory. One can however scratch satisfying accuracy given 
the particularity of the aspect.  
Comparing the Ottoman census of 1914 to the Greek of 1910-1912, there is a 
difference of roughly 117.247 Greeks between them, a 35% divergence. The helping 
hand at this point is the work of Justin McCarthy251. McCarthy uses a “correction 
factor”252 when dealing with the Ottoman censi to raise the artificially reduced Greek 
population in an attempt to defend their trustworthiness253. McCarthy uses his factor 
only in vılaets and not in each sancak254, which makes his numbers debatable.  
If we however apply the “correction factor”, the numbers of the Ottoman 
census rise to 356.114, merely a 97.000 and 27% difference to the Greek one255. If the 
“correction factor” was applied evenly to all the vilaets, the Greek population would 
be more than 397.000, a number which seems the most plausible since the Greeks in 
the early 1910s  could not have been less than 336.000 and more than 454.000256.     
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3. Limits and realizations of the “Megali Idea”: Pontic attempts                                                        
to self-determination 
              3a. autonomy, independence or inclusion into the modern Greek state 
With the end of the of the First World War, Greece was on the winning side 
thanks to its engagement in the Macedonian front in the last stages of the war. In the 
Paris Peace Conference Greece’s claims were put forward in a comprehensive 
memorandum, drafted by Venizelos himself at President Wilson’s suggestion in twelve 
hours of uninterrupted work. It followed the lines of a memo he had sent to Lloyd 
George when he was in London in early November 1918257. In this he had argued in 
favor of a threefold settlement in Asiatic Turkey: the creation of an Armenian state; 
the creation under the auspices of the League of Nations of an independent state of 
Constantinople and Eastern Thrace, to assure the freedom of the Straits; and the 
annexation of western Asia Minor to Greece. Venizelos argued that the large area he 
claimed in Asia Minor could be delimited ‘without the slightest difficulty’. This could 
be done in such a way as to include an Ottoman population roughly equal to the 
800,000 or so Greeks who remained outside the area, and the peace treaty should 
then encourage mutual and voluntary intermigration. He was attracted by a solution 
whereby Asia Minor would eventually consist of homogeneous national areas, with a 
strong, defensible Greek zone which would not be subverted from within. In his 
memorandum to the peace conference, Venizelos claimed the maximum that he 
realistically felt was attainable258.  
Venizelos went on to list his statistics for the distribution of the Hellenic nation 
within and outside the kingdom of Greece. He claimed all the islands of the Aegean, 
both those which were under Ottoman sovereignty, and the Dodecanese which had 
been under Italian occupation for six years. On cultural and historical grounds, he 
claimed almost the whole of Northern Epirus with its mixed population of Greeks and 
Albanians, of whom the majority spoke Albanian. He claimed both Western (Bulgarian) 
and Eastern (Turkish) Thrace, despite the majority of Muslims over Greeks recognized 
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in Greek statistics. In Asia Minor he proposed to solve the Pontus problem by 
incorporating the vilayet of Trebizond, where the Greeks were most densely 
concentrated, in the new state of Armenia. This was the best he could do for a 
population too distant for Greece to protect and too weak to protect itself. He had 
wisely refused to endorse the demands of the Pontic Greeks that Pontus should 
become an independent Greek republic259.  
In western Asia Minor Greece claimed the strip lying west of a line running 
from near Panderma on the Sea of Marmara to a point on the south coast opposite 
Kastellorizo. The zone included Smyrna and most of the vilayet of Aydin. According to 
Venizelos’ figures, which were those of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s census of 1912, 
the zone contained just over 800,000 Greeks as against just over one million Turks and 
just over 100,000 Armenians, Jews and others. Venizelos got around these 
inconvenient figures by including in the zone for statistical purposes the neighbouring 
islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Ikaria, Rhodes and the Dodecanese, 
and Kastellorizo, where Greeks easily outnumbered Turks. He argued that these 
islands were geographically an extension of the mainland. On this basis Venizelos was 
able to argue for the cession of Asia Minor on ethnographic, historical and cultural 
grounds260.  
The logic of Greece’s claims purported to be primarily ethnographic. It was 
based on President Wilson’s principle of self-determination. This was the fashion of 
the time and it was no doubt essential that Greek claims be couched in this form261. 
One should take into account that the circumstances at the time were ideal for the 
pursuit of Greater Greece. 
Great Britain was Greece’s main ally and its interests seemed to coincide with 
the Greek ones. Within the Foreign Office there was a significant group who wished 
to cast Greece in the role of regional power and regional British proxy. With the ending 
of the war in 1918 the actual conduct of the negotiations over Greek related questions 
fell into the hands of this group of philhellenes, centered on the new Political 
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Intelligence Department. The most important philhellenes were Sir Eyre Crowe, Allen 
Leeper, Harold Nicolson, and to a lesser extent Arnold Toynbee. From the ending of 
the war in November I9I8 until Venizelos' fall two years later they pushed for the 
creation of an Anglo-Greek entente in which a Greater Greece would be Britain's chief 
ally in this historically sensitive area262. That was until the fall of Venizelos of course. 
The Sèvres Treaty (28 July/ 10 August 1920) was the highlight of the Greek 
expansionist policy. The realization of the “Megali Idea” seemed feasible.  The terms 
referring to Greece were based upon the conclusions of the commission established 
by Lloyd George. This commission delimited an area around Smyrna and suggested 
that it be set under Greek control. Based on American censi it claimed that 375.000 
Greeks and 325.000 Muslims lived in the area of interest.  Turks would formally retain 
the suzerain and as an exchange Eastern Thrace until the Çatalca line would be given 
to Greece with full sovereignty. A local parliament would be established in Smyrna 
which after five years would decide whether the area would be annexed by Greece or 
not263.   
Western Thrace was also fully ceded to Greece, as was the case with Eastern 
Thrace under the term that Dedeağaç would become an international port and include 
a Bulgarian zone. The Greek army occupied both territories from the middle of 1920. 
The supreme allied council had given its written approval for the occupation. 
Furthermore, it had once again requested for Greek military support after the 
belligerent Turkish stance against the peace treaty compiled in Sanremo and 
presented to the Turkish delegation in 28 April/ 11 May. Taking advantage of this 
opportunity, the Greeks not only suppressed every resistance in Thrace by entering 
Adrianople (Edirne), but they also cleared the whole region between Smyrna and the 
Dardanelles (Çannakkale boğazı), by seizing Bursa, the old capital of the Ottoman 
empire.          
The Sèvres Treaty attested the Aegean islands to Greece. Some of them would 
have to be demilitarized since they were part of the demilitarized zone of the Straits, 
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which included Gelibolu (Gallipoli) and substantial acreage in both banks of Bosporus 
(İstanbul boğazı) and the Dardanelles. Control of the Straits would be the task of an 
international commission in which Greece and Turkey (when it would have joined the 
League of Nations) would take part. The responsibility for this zone, which 
Constantinople would be part of would fall on a guard made up of French, British and 
Italian forces, as well as local arms of Greek and Turkish gendarmerie under allied rule.  
Constantinople would remain the capital city of Turkey and base of the Sultan. 
The allies though reserved to modify this regulation had Turkey not conformed to the 
general terms of the treaty, especially those regarding the issues of the minorities264. 
It is now time to examine the requests and actions of the Pontic Greek side, 
from the Great War to 1922 and the exodus.  Russian advance in Pontus in 1916 and 
1917 brought as it would be expected enthusiasm to the Pontic Greek population265.  
When the Russian army entered Trebizond, some of the most prominent Greeks 
started considering a type of an “autonomous” solution for the entire Pontus region, 
especially after the Russian occupation of the Eastern Pontus and the newly created 
political situation266. 
The February Revolution in Russia was a catalyst for the future of Hellenism in 
Pontus267. The leader of the temporary government Alexander Kerensky was in favor 
of a pro-Greek solution in the Pontic issue and even supported the creation of a Greek 
regime in Asia Minor. Some Russian generals suggested the creation of a Greek beach 
strip from Rize to Bafra, an area they could later claim in the Peace Conference. This 
suggestion was not accepted though mainly due to the limited presence of Greek 
population268. In any case there was constant movement during the whole of 1917 
and after the convening of the National Assembly  in Tbilisi in 5/5 1917269 and the 1st 
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Pan-Russian Congress of the Greeks of Russia270 in Таганрог (Taganrog, Ταϊγάνιο) in 
29/6-10/7 1917271, the survival and  then the political future of the Hellenism of 
Pontus as the Ottoman empire crumbled were discussed in both congresses. The need 
for “national survival” made it imperative that the Greeks take up military action, 
especially in Transcaucasia (Закавказье, Υπερκαυκασία) . It was the only way that self-
defense could be achieved272. Despite the attempts made, the coordination of the 
Greek troops in Caucasus and Pontus did not move beyond training in gun usage and 
the sending of some supplies273.  It was however clear that the Pontic Greeks in 
Southern Russia at least, were oriented towards an autonomous Pontus274..   A typical 
example of this tendency is the “Central Union of Pontic Greeks in Екатеринбу́рг 
(Yekaterinburg Αικατερινούπολη)” organization in October 1918275, 
After the congress a number of organizations were formed in Europe as well. 
The most worth noting is the National League of Pontus (League du Pont) founded on 
the 1st October 1917 in Paris under the presidency of K. Konstantinides, who was the 
first one to formally request an independent Pontus state276. The proposed borders 
were those of the main Pontus, west of the Sinop peninsula, from Ortalık, Boyabat 
(Domanitis), Gümüş Maden (Haci Köy), west of Merzifon, Mecit Ozu, Southwest of 
Amasya, South of Tokat      (Evdokias), South of Sebin Karahisar (Nikopolis), Southeast 
up to Keltik and East from Gümüşhane (Argyroupolis) to the port South of Batum277. 
These borders were the generally at the time approved borders of Pontus. 
During the Paris Peace Conference there was no organized movement on 
behalf of the Pontic Greeks. There was always a fear of retaliation from the Turks as 
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the telegram colonel Katheniotis sent to Venizelos and the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
on 14th May 1920 suggests278. Every action undertaken was a result of the reactions 
caused by Venizelos’ proposal on the 17th December 1919279. Pontus was not part of 
the Greek territorial claims. Venizelos suggested that the vilaet of Trebizond would be 
ceded to the nascent state of Armenia, a proposal he himself had come up with and 
with which the Pontic Greeks disagreed280. During its works Pontic Greeks composed 
numerous memoranda to present their assertions. They were directed towards the 
Conference, the Greek delegation and government and the Armenian counterparts as 
well. 
By November 1919 though, the change of the American policy in the region 
brought about new correlations and problems. Katheniotis was sure by December that 
there was no hope of success of the Pontic issue281. Because of the negative attitude 
of the Great Powers and Venizelos’ as well, towards an independent Pontus, 
metropolitan Chrysanthos agreed on the 3rd /16th January 1920 with the Armenians to 
the creation of a Ponto-Armenian Federation at first and then to a military agreement 
for the landing of Greek army in Trebizond, that would march from Ercican to Erzurum 
in order to protect the Greeks of Pontus, with the parallel succor of the Armenian army 
in the borders of Caucasus and Erzurum282. This agreement however, never went 
beyond the paper due to the rapid developments and the growth of the Kemalist 
movement, the weakness of the Armenian government, the inability of the Greek side 
to take up the initiative and the indifference or the objection of the Great Powers to 
such plans. Equally important factor was the suspicion of both sides and the fact than 
neither one was satisfied with what the other offered283.  Katheniotis claimed in 
January 1920 that Armenians were nostalgic both of the Russian and Ottoman regime 
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because during their time their commercial activities were free. They were even 
positive towards the new Bolshevik regime284.  
By the early 1920 the Armenian issue was discussed more and more tensely 
but the Pontus issue was nowhere to be found as an independent one285. From 
January the Greek embassies informed that the Great Powers were positive for the 
creation of an autonomous state under Sultan rule in Western Asia Minor, should the 
Greeks abandon every idea for an independent Pontus or even the inclusion of 
Trebizond in Armenia286. 
In April 1920, during the Sanremo Congress works, the independence of 
Armenia was recognized (11-24 April 1920) with access to the Black Sea. However, 
there was not even a single mention of Pontus287. The Greek side did not have 
particular room for movement. It considered that independence was long lost and that 
it had been a mistake of the Pontic Greeks not to accept the Federation with the 
Armenians. The only solution now was the fight for minority rights. Venizelos 
proposed once again the inclusion of the vilaet of Trebizond to Armenia288. 
After the approval of the Powers and the march of the Greek army in Eastern 
Thrace and Northwestern Asia Minor, Venizelos discussed with Lloyd George whether 
Mustafa Kemal could be dealt with. The former believed it was possible through allied 
help and also believed that peace with Kemal could be achieved if he was somehow 
pressed to it through a Ponto-Armenian state, the capture of the region up to the 
Adramitt Bey (Edremit Körfezi) and its union with Greece or with the removal of 
Muslims from Constantinople, as it is presented in his letter towards the British Prime 
Minister in 2/15 June. Venizelos rested his hopes for the federation of Greek Pontus 
and Armenia upon Lloyd George. The Greek statesman even declared that Greece 
would enter Trebizond, Eski Şehir, Afyon Karahisar and Bursa. This means that there 
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was a possibility of Greek intervention, but as Venizelos said, this would happen only 
in the case that the Ottoman Empire would not sign the Peace Treaty289. 
The Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 28 July/ 10 August 1920 and did not 
mention anything about a special status of Pontus, rather than general declarations 
about Christian minorities’ rights. Despite the disappointment of the Pontic Greeks, 
the issue was still alive and the tendency for the fight for independence constantly 
gained ground. On 20 August Venizelos promised to the National Board of Pontic 
Greeks, that he would take up action for the capture of Pontus under Greek 
mandate290. 
  On 22 September/ 5 October 1920, under the light of the Kemalist attacks in 
Armenia, Venizelos proposed in his telegram towards Lloyd George the creation of a 
separate state in Pontus as a means of defeating Kemal and at the same time 
suggested a new campaign in Ankara and Pontus for his demise. This state would 
consist of the remaining Greeks in Pontus, but also those who had fled to Russia in the 
last 50 years. According to him, they were approximately 800.000. Pontus alongside 
Armenia and Georgia would be a bulwark against Islamism and Russian expansionism. 
Greece would be able to undertake this task with the financial aid of Britain. At the 
same day he filed a petition to marshal H. Wilson, in which he asked the formation of 
a Pontic state based on his attack plan. The Greek plan was a coordinated attack during 
which the Greek army would reach Ankara within a month and at the same time 
Pontus would be liberated. Venizelos sent a similar letter to Lloyd George without 
sending it to Foreign Office. But there were also British suggestions for wider 
operations in Pontus, as well as Smyrna and Constantinople and the creation of a state 
in Pontus to apply more pressure on the Kemalists. There were of course opposite 
opinions expressed. Mainly due to fears about the fate of the Christian population that 
lived outside the areas of operations291. 
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Venizelos on the eve of the elections was confident that Pontus would be 
liberated, even though he believed that things would be better if Pontic Greeks had 
accepted his plan. Henry Wilson asked Venizelos to present him with the 
ethnographical borders of Pontus and the latter in response presented on the 12th his 
plan for the creation of a Pontic Republic from Trebizond to Sinop in the coast and 
from Amasya (Αμάσεια) to Tokat and Sebin Karahisar. All these actions were part of 
an increased undertaking of Venizelos in the Pontic affairs that caused further 
mobilization of the Pontic Greeks. The Greek Prime Minister re-assured everyone, 
even on the day of the elections 1/14 November 1920, that if the Kemalists do not 
abide by their obligations, he has the approval of the allies to seize Constantinople 
and form the Republic of Pontus. His electoral loss however, changed 
everything292.Three telegrams show Venizelos’ opinion on the Pontus issue at the 
time. In his correspondence to Archbishop Chrysanthos (8th January 1920), the 
president of the National council of Pontus (Εθνικόν Συμβούλιον Πόντου) Ioannides 
(8th January 1920) and the Pontic National Assembly (9th January), becomes clear that 
the former Prime Minister expected nothing more than absolutely nothing for 
Pontus293.  
The comeback of Constantine on the Greek throne was the perfect opportunity 
especially for France and Italy to stabilize their change of views. By 17/30 September 
1920, France and Italy signed the redefinition of the Treaty of Sèvres in Aix le Bains in 
favor of the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and the Ottomans started asking more 
insistently the re-negotiation of the terms of the Peace Treaty294.   
1921 was foreshadowed as a bad one for the Pontic Greeks not only In terms 
of establishing a state but also their very existence. The new wave of organized 
persecutions after December 1920, the arrest of prominent members of the Greek 
communities and the recruitment yet again of Greeks to the “amele taburu”, pointed 
to this direction. Kemalist activity increased even more, after the appointment of 
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Topal Osman as general commander of the coast, from İnebolu (Inepolis) to Hopa in 
March295. 
As far as the Pontus issue is concerned, there was not much of a progress until 
February, with the exception of very few reports and memoranda towards the Greek 
ministry of Foreign Affairs. A memorandum of A. Neophytos is characteristic: He 
talked about union with Greece through the founding of an independent Pontic state 
that would also carry away Bithynia, in the same way as Macedonia carried away the 
unification of Thrace, thus creating a state “being”. He claimed that such a state would 
function as a balancing factor in Asia Minor after the founding of the three republics 
in Caucasus, while he considered the suspicion of Armenians to be the reason for the 
failure of the Ponto-Armenian cooperation. He however warned, that if the necessary 
measures were not to be taken, the Greek population would be annihilated in the 
following months296. 
From 8/21 February to 2/15 March 1921 a Conference in London was held, 
under the light of the recent changes in Greece. The Great Powers proposed the 
reconsideration of the Sèvres Treaty. The presence of Kemalist representatives meant 
more or less the acceptance of Kemal’s movement by the allies. While the French 
Prime Minister  Aristide Briand  discussed the possibility of the withdrawal of the 
French troops from Cilicia, the Greek representatives proposed to Lloyd George a plan 
for the marching of the Greek army to Ankara in order to deal with the Kemalist 
movement once and for all. Its effort would be assisted with the landing of Greek 
troops in Pontus and their descent to Sivas (Σεβάστεια) and Erzurum, i.e. the center 
of the Kemalist movement. The response of Britain did not seem to be negative at 
least for the Ankara part, but there was no approval either. This way Venizelos’ draft 
“rose to the surface” again for a short period without any further progress297. The 
future of the Greeks of Pontus was not discussed during the Conference298. 
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Konstantinides addressed to Venizelos in February asking for independence for 
the whole of Pontus from Sinop to Rize (Ριζούντα), expressing at the same time the 
denial for the inclusion of Trebizond to Armenia. The latter forwarded these claims to 
the British but to no end once again. Konstantinides also sent a memorandum to the 
Greek Prime Minister Kalogeropoulos, asking for autonomy and the reassurance of 
peace and order in the region. The National Council of the Greeks of Pontus sent a 
similar memorandum limiting its claims to autonomy or at least the end of the 
Ottoman yoke and the protection of Pontus from Britain. The disagreements though, 
between Pontic Greeks and the crisis itself had become more intense299.  
On 27 June/ 10 July 1921 the great Greek attack led to the capture of 
Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya and Eskişehir. Venizelos disagreeing with the Greek 
government proposed that Greece should claim the whole vilaet of Aydın, the greatest 
part of the vilaet of Bursa, international command in Constantinople and an 
autonomous province in Trebizond, having even late been persuaded for the necessity 
of autonomy for Pontus300. 
The situation however did not improve for the Pontic Greeks and it got even 
worse after the enchainment of the Greek army in Sakarya (Σαγγάριος) river in August 
1921301. In 1922, during the months before the Catastrophe, the issue of the 
elimination of Pontic Greeks was discussed tensely but was eventually overshadowed 
by the dramatic events in the Asia Minor front in August. 
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                     3b. Aims and scopes of the international factor 
The end of World War I brought with it, Peace and a chaos in its settlement as 
well. The allies had promised practically everything to everyone and now had to deal 
with a post-war world that had seen two great empires fall apart. Many states had 
claims, new states were under formation and the Great Powers had to take into 
account their own interests too. In the Ottoman empire, an issue closely linked to 
Middle East, the allies had conflicting ideas and interests that eventually influenced in 
a great way the outcome of the Greco-Turkish war and the fate of the Asia Minor 
Hellenism.   
Britain’s concern was to limit the French presence in the shores of Syria, by 
depriving it of Cilicia. It did not wish the implementation of the secret agreements 
claiming they were agreed under different circumstances, and now with the Bolshevik 
win, things had changed. Therefore, Britain did not consider itself bound by them, 
something in October 1918 to Italy during the discussions for the latter’s claims in Asia 
Minor. Prominent members of the British and French political scene though like 
former prime minister Asquith, under-secretary of foreign affairs R. Cecil and his 
French counterpart Alexandre Millerand were in early November in favor of the 
termination of the Ottoman empire’s rule upon its subjugated people302. 
Britain had expressed its views on the Armenian issue as early as 1917 
providing general promises for the territorial issue. Its policy was largely guided by the 
PID (Political Intelligence Department) and the Eastern Committee, whose main target 
was to limit the French and Italian demands based on the secret agreements303. On 
8/21 November 1918, a British memorandum was presented for Greater Armenia, 
with borders from Mersin to Ordu (Κοτύωρα), including thus an important part of 
Pontus (almost the entire eastern Pontus). British policy sought to create powerful 
states that would resist the Russian-Bolshevik power in the region. However, Britain 
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did not want to take up the supervision of these states, as it intended to leave the 
region soon304. 
On 3/16 December 1918, the British minister of foreign affairs suggested a 13 
points solution for Caucasus. Curzon was in favor of the British presence despite 
opposite voices claiming that the danger and financial difficulties were too great to 
allow such thing. British presence though, did not have a certain aim and was unable 
to function efficiently and in harmony. Part of the plan for Caucasus was the 
suggestion for an independent Armenia that would further weaken the Ottoman 
empire in an effort to eliminate problems in the future. The plan, having the approval 
of both the Eastern Committee and the Foreign Office , was for the supervision to be 
given to the USA for all the Caucasian Republics, including the unified Armenia, since 
it was believed that Armenia alone would not be able to resist Russia, but also the 
Pan-Turanic and Pan-Islamist pressure from the Ottoman empire and the Muslim 
populations of the region305. During this period, A. Toynbee presented a report titled 
“The future Turkish state” on 9th December (n.d.), in which he ruled out any possibility 
of cessions to Greece in Asia Minor and suggested that the Greeks of the Black Sea 
littoral be accommodated in the new Armenian state, closing in to the American 
tendency of the time that was constantly gaining ground306. 
During the period 1910-1919 France’s policy in the partition of the Ottoman 
empire issue was full of unjustified consents and clumsy handling. In the beginning of 
the century its economic and cultural presence in Asia Minor and Near East was 
impressive. 60% of the Ottoman public debt was under French control, the capital 
sharing through the controlled Ottoman Bank (Banque Ottomane) reached 53,5%. 
However, for many, the ethical and cultural presence, a century-long phenomenon 
was far more important than the economic one. The clumsy handling though of the 
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Paris government meant that in just a decade the advantages gained over centuries 
were lost307. 
In Fall 1918 with the end of the war, Britain’s position in the Near East was 
strengthened. France, accepted the loss of Palestine despite the danger for Syria, still 
being in shock from the war. In December Clemanceau, ceded Mosul to the British in 
return for the French recognition in Syria, Cilicia and Lebanon. A fatal mistake, since 
the aforementioned was a reality recognized by the Sykes-Picot Agreement308. 
By 1919 the British position in the Near East was at its height. France thought 
that a deal should be made with Britain due to the new facts in the region. By spring 
1920 though, with the new government in power, France turned in favor of the 
integrity of the Ottoman empire. As a result, the idea of an approach with the Turkish 
nationalists was constantly gaining ground in Paris309. 
The Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920 was very good for Greece. France 
signed the Treaty in order to avoid a fracture of the allies that seemed unavoidable. 
From its signing though it sought ways to overhaul its terms. It was an essential move 
to gain the Turkish trust. And the opportunity came with the Greek elections in 
November 1920310. From this point onwards the French-Turkish approach grew by the 
day also because of the Soviet-Kemalist approach.      
American policy was in general terms negative towards Greeks and their 
national claims. This was partly due to the new policy pursued in Asia Minor. In an 
effort for greater financial penetration, it was understood that the powerful economic 
and cultural presence of Greeks would be a problem. The Americans preferred to 
converse with a nationalist Turkish state without a background of solid Turkish 
structures, rather than the dominant economically Greek element. 
It would be much easier, in other words, for the Turks, who did not have solid 
economic and merchant tradition and were  significantly regressive, to grant privileges 
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to the American interests, especially during the Asia Minor Campaign, when the aid of 
powerful states in their struggle against the Greeks was imperative311. 
Even in Pontus the choice of Armenians made sense. The Armenian case was 
much more known to the American policy, whereas the Greek one was almost 
unknown. Furthermore, the success of American missionaries among the Armenians 
and the failure among the Greeks, meant that cooperation with the latter would be at 
best difficult. But the former, were also abandoned when the USA realized that Great 
Armenia would be really hard to happen and would not provide substantial profit, 
since it had turned out that Asia Minor was not that promising in terms of investments. 
The support of Kemal was risky, but the chances of success were greater, since 
almost all the allies were against the Greek military presence in Anatolia and secondly 
the inability of Armenians to prevail militarily312. 
Soviet Union took advantage of the common enmity they shared with Kemal 
for the Allies regarding the issue of the Straits. Of course, Kemal used the “anti-
imperialist” card efficiently. This was highly convenient for the USSR, since it could 
now turn its large Muslim masses that were causing a lot of trouble against the West. 
A first contact was made in summer 1919, and then a pact was signed on 16/29 
November 1919 after talks held in Baku, Trebizond and Istanbul. A new agreement, 
the first official was signed on 7/20 April 1920 for the determination of the borders 
based on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the common refusal for the creation of an 
Armenian state. The Soviets were at the same time urged the Kemalists not to accept 
allied presence in Asia Minor. On 15/28 April Azerbaijan became Soviet territory, 
laying thus the foundations of the Soviet-Kemalist approach313. On 11/24 August 1920 
an agreement plan for the aid provided by the Soviets was signed after seven months 
of disagreements for Armenia and Caucasus314. 
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 During the approach, the Novorossiysk Bolsheviks in accordance with 
Moscow, suggested to the Council of Batum, through the Greeks of Novorossiysk on 
27th April cooperation with exchange for help in the struggle for the independence of 
Pontus, providing financial aid but not officers. Greek government considered the 
suggestions to be unacceptable but advised the Council to continue the talks, because 
of the Pontic Greeks that lived in Southern Russia and should not be jeopardized315. 
Catalyst to the events that followed was the Friendship and Cooperation 
Agreement signed in 3/16 March 1921 in Moscow. Soviet Union considered the 
Kemalist movement a revolutionary one, given the fact that it seemed to oppose to 
Western Powers, but also because Kemal had threatened the Soviets with an 
approach with the Westerns. They also signed an agreement for financial and military 
aid. The Bolsheviks assisted Kemal believing the Greeks were an instrument of the 
British policy. Soviet aid has been rendered by many scholars as decisive for the course 
of the facts. Kemalists themselves admitted that two months prior to the attack of the 
Greek army they were significantly aided from the Soviets financially with the shipping 
of gold and militarily with guns, ammunition and training by Soviet officers316. 
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                                       3c. Turkish reaction 
 The Kemalist movement grew stronger during the whole of 1919.  In a meeting 
of the military leadership in Amasya in June 1919 and the Protocol that followed is 
evident the will to resist the allied decisions. The next national congress was organized 
by the “Company for the Protection of the rights of Anatolia” in Erzurum on July 23rd. 
Kemal was recognized as the leader of the struggle, the opposition to the partition of 
the country was stated and the slogan “Turkey to the Turks” dominated. In September 
(4-11) the national assembly of Sivas (Σεβάστεια) was held. Among other things, there 
was the validation of what had been decided in Erzurum317.   
Kemal signed two extremely important Treaties in the early 1921. On 9th March 
1921 (new calendar), he signed a first agreement with France for the withdrawal of 
the French troops from Cilicia in exchange for money. On 12th March he signed a 
similar agreement with Italy for the Southwestern Asia Minor. He achieved in other 
words the closing of three major fronts but also gained an unexpectedly huge amount 
of guns, ammunition, war material and large sums of money, along with the important 
supply lines. 
In April Kemalists initiated a new phase of persecutions. Under Topal Osman’s 
command solid Greek popoulations were eliminated despite the efforts to awaken the 
allies.  The systematic elimination of the Pontic Greeks began after May 1921. 
Murders, rapes, violent acts and displacements climaxed during the summer. At the 
same time there is an increase in the guerilla activity of the Pontic Greeks who 
achieved important wins in July318. However, these actions were part of a program 
conceived much earlier. From early 1916 the decision to eliminate the Greeks of 
Pontus in a similar way to the Armenians had been taken by the Young Turk leadership. 
Talaat Pasha had admitted in a personal conversation to an Austrian agent on 31st 
January 1916 that: “ It is necessary for Turkey to get rid of the Greeks as it previously 
did with the Armenians” . Furthermore, in an extremely confidential report sent by 
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the Austrian consul in Samsun (Σαμψούντα) Kviatovski, it is characteristically written 
that the Mutessarıf had told him: “We must already get rid of the Greeks. I sent today 
divisions of the gendarmery to the outskirts of the city with orders to kill every Greek 
they encounter in their way”319.  
In September 1921 Kemal set up the “Independence Courts”, an attempt to 
give legal legitimacy to the displacement of the Greeks. The charge was taking part in 
activities for the purpose of the creation of a Greek republic.  After a grotesque trial 
they were executed. These trials were conducted away from the coastal cities behind 
closed doors320. 
In October 1921 Kemal signed two new agreements with France and the Soviet 
Union, further stabilizing his position. On 13th October (new calendar) he signed in 
Kars, a Friendship and Brotherhood Agreement with the Soviet Union and the Trans- 
Caucasian Republics i.e. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in which the borders were 
defined. On the 7/20 October 1921 the new French- Kemalist pact was signed. It is the 
so- called Ankara pact or Franklin- Bouillon Pact. It was an agreement for financial 
cooperation in exchange for military material including airplanes321.  
On 13th /26th August 1922 Kemal launched an attack against the Greek army. 
The latter did not manage to pose serious resistance and the front was dispelled. Asia 
Minor Catastrophe, the slaughterhouse of Greeks and Armenians in Smyrna, the 
indifference of the Great Powers and finally the Moudania Truce on 28th October /11th 
November 1922322 is the tragic epilogue to the Asia Minor campaign and the definite 
end to the Greek presence in Asia Minor and of course Pontus.   The Treaty of 
Lausanne on 24th July 1923 and the Greco-Turkish Exchange of Populations Agreement 
on 17th /30th December 1923 sealed the end.  
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                                                     Conclusion 
Pontus has always been a particular case among Greek populations. For it is 
the circumstances that were probably the hardest than in any other region. Despite 
the odds the Pontic Greeks preserved their identity and culture during the Ottoman 
era and asserted their freedom and independence when time seemed right. 
 However, its distance from mainland Greece, the chaotic post-war world, the 
objective difficulties and a number of mistakes led things to utter disaster. The 
genocide of the Greeks of Pontus and the Asia Minor Catastrophe is a part of Greek 
history where time stood still. The aforementioned did not only affect the Asia Minor 
Greeks. The extirpation of these populations had a huge impact on Greece itself. After 
almost a quarter of a century of constant warfare Greece was now defeated and weak. 
A hundred years after the Independence War, Greek state and society had to make a 
restart in the most demanding and urgent way.   
 Greeks of Pontus have always been an organic part of the body of Hellenism, 
as it is proven by their language, their religion, their customs, their endurance but 
most importantly in the writer’s opinion during the 1896-1922 period. 
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